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Key messages
•

The discoveries of major deposits of oil and gas have historically generated significant hope for economic development in countries not previously known as petroleum-rich—sometimes called “new producers.” One source of optimism has been
the theory that the discovery would reduce investors’ perception of geological risk
and enable governments of producing countries to negotiate more favorable future
contracts.

•

A review of publicly available contracts across eight new producer countries shows
that evidence in support of this theory in the recent past is mixed. Three of the eight
secured more favorable terms in the contracts they signed after a discovery than in
contracts they signed before the discovery. The other five countries studied demonstrated no such pattern.

•

In some cases, governments did not take advantage of newfound post-discovery
leverage. In others, such leverage did not materialize.

•

The climate crisis and the global energy transition pose a further challenge to assumptions about government leverage in new producer countries, with the prospects of lower investor interest and lower value for production. Long-term global
investment in the sector must decline dramatically to meet global climate goals,
and many investors have begun to shift away from new projects. Governments in
new producer countries should undertake sober analysis of market scenarios when
deciding whether and how to pursue new projects, and should internally align their
petroleum, finance, energy and climate objectives.
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Executive summary
The petroleum industry is volatile, and governments in “new producer” countries
have operated at a significant information disadvantage when negotiating with
international oil companies. This challenge is growing today; new producer
countries face intensifying questions around whether to offer fiscal incentives to
maintain investment in the face of 1) the pandemic-induced volatility in oil prices
and 2) long-term questions about the future of the industry in the face of the climate
crisis and the global energy transition.
This confluence of short-term and long-term uncertainty is prompting a
reexamination of the narrative that once took hold in many new producer countries.
The traditional story was one of linear progression from being non-producers to
small levels of production to ultimately having oil and gas become a major economic
contributor over the long term.
This notion of progression was associated with a commonly held theory: After
a country’s first major discovery, the geological risk that wells will be dry was
expected to decrease. Countries could therefore shift from a position of having
to grant tax breaks (and other concessions) to international investors, to taking a
tougher stance in laws and negotiations for new projects going forward.
In this paper we examine whether this theory has been borne out in practice
and make recommendations to support new producers in their navigation of the
uncertainty associated with the energy transition.
Among the eight “new producer” countries, for which we analyzed a total of 26
contracts signed before and 25 contracts signed after discovery events (all occurring
between 2001 and 2014), the evidence is mixed.
Only three of the eight countries in our sample—Ghana, Mozambique and
Uganda—demonstrated a clear pattern in the direction of more stringent terms in
post-discovery contracts. They featured definitive steps to increase some of the
obligations of contractors to the state, and no significant terms that became less
stringent. Five out of eight countries did not meaningfully alter their approach to
gain greater concessions from their company partners.
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Category:
operational/
fiscal
Operational

Fiscal

Term type

Countries where terms
became clearly more
stringent

Countries where terms
became clearly less
stringent
Guyana, Senegal

Relinquishment of
portions of the oil block
back to the state
Duration of first
“exploration period”

Uganda, Mozambique
(Rovuma and PT), Kenya

Senegal

Minimum expenditure for
first period of exploration

Ghana, Mauritania, Liberia,
Senegal

Kenya

Stabilization clause

Ghana, Mozambique
(Rovuma and PT)

Income tax

Ghana (additional oil
entitlement)

Exemptions from income
tax

Mozambique (Rovuma
and PT)

Royalty

Ghana, Uganda,
Mozambique (Rovuma
and PT)

Profit oil

Mozambique (Rovuma and
PT); Guyana, Liberia

Mauritania, Senegal

Cost oil

Mozambique (Rovuma and
PT); Mauritania

Kenya

Bonus (signature and
production)

Uganda, Mozambique (PT),
Mauritania, Liberia, Kenya

State equity

Ghana, Kenya

Contribution to
community

Kenya

Local content

Mozambique (Rovuma),
Uganda (1 of 2 contracts),
Senegal, Kenya

Mauritania

Guyana, Liberia

In some cases, this could be because governments did not take advantage of their
newfound post-discovery leverage. In others, it could be because the leverage did
not materialize: geology may have proven disappointing after a flurry of excitement,
global market shifts impacted investor confidence, or internal political dynamics
steered the government toward other priorities. Today, the evolution of the global
energy transition are surely factors further dampening the leverage of these
governments.
Experience from the recent past offers some valuable lessons for government
officials when it comes to making decisions about whether and when to conduct
licensing exercises and on how to structure government demands on any new
projects going forward. We recommend that new producer governments:
•

Undertake sober analysis of market scenarios when deciding whether to pursue
new projects, and internally coordinate to align petroleum, finance, energy and
climate objectives.

•

Set clear priorities and objectives and integrate them coherently into planning
processes; a strategic vision for decisions about negotiations, informed by public
consultation, will be more important than ever as profit margins shrink going
forward.
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•

Communicate regularly and openly with industry counterparts. This is
important for understanding the market’s perceptions of the country, its
geology and its fiscal terms, as well as broader market trends.

•

Award contracts by competitive bidding (where governments decide to pursue
licensing or to negotiate new contracts). This is the surest way for government
officials to understand the market, select partners effectively, and maximize
company contributions.

•

Standardize terms in legislation to the maximum degree possible, and reduce
the scope of terms that are up for negotiation on individual contracts. This can
help the government set the terms for deals according to a coherent strategy that
takes account of emerging realities.

•

Build the institutional memory of the government and learn from the
performance of past contract bidding, negotiation and implementation. This can
strengthen sector management and help to avoid past mistakes.

•

Stress-test contract terms, fiscal regimes and the position of the country’s overall
approach to the sector with an eye to where the country’s resources sit on the cost
curve. This can enable governments to manage national risk across a variety of
energy transition scenarios.

At a broader level, governments of new producer countries must seek opportunities
to innovate, including by working within government and with prospective
partners. Government should:
•

Systematically adopt built-in terms within extractive contracts that better
protect governments and companies against long-term volatility and
uncertainty (e.g., periodic review, progressive fiscal terms).

•

Coordinate closely across government, to align objectives across the bodies
responsible for petroleum, finance, energy and climate and ensure a coherent
strategy that keeps expectations in check and enables citizens to thrive in a lowcarbon future.

•

Develop new kinds of terms that provide for minimizing the carbon footprint in
operations that remain cost competitive (through zero routine flaring and the
use of renewable energies to power the needs of the operations).

•

Apply the skills and practices developed in the hydrocarbons sector to new areas
of potential growth, including climate smart mining and agriculture, renewable
energy technology and/or green hydrogen.
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Introduction
During the last two decades, the world saw a wave of discoveries of oil and gas
in countries not traditionally known as petroleum-rich, from Ghana to Guyana
to Tanzania. Petroleum is a volatile industry, and governments in these “new
producer” countries have operated at a significant information disadvantage when
negotiating with international oil companies.
This challenge is growing today. New producer countries face intensifying questions
around whether to offer fiscal incentives to maintain investment in light of pandemicinduced volatility in oil prices and long-term questions about the future of the
industry, given the global energy transition.1 The coronavirus pandemic prompted
substantial revenue declines for new producer governments, which also reported
declining interest in investment. This led to delays in final investment decisions and
performance of work-plan obligations in ongoing projects; requests by companies to
change contract terms, and the postponement of licensing rounds for new projects.2
Oil prices began to rebound in 2021, but some industry analysts and officials in
producer governments have treated the shock as a wake-up call to spur reflection
on whether technological changes and consumer-country commitments to “build
back better” in the aftermath of the pandemic could further accelerate the energy
transition, with disruptive effects on producer countries’ plans.3
This confluence of short-term crisis and long-term uncertainty is prompting a
reexamination of the narrative common in new producer countries, of a linear
progression from being non-producers to small levels of production to ultimately
having oil and gas as a major economic contributor over the long term.
One component of this narrative has centered around the question of leverage
in contracting. Governments in many countries expected that a first major oil
discovery would raise them out of the ranks of the “frontier” of the industry and
increase their leverage in the negotiation of subsequent contracts with international
oil companies. This implied that these countries could shift from a position where
they are expected to grant tax breaks and other concessions—to attract oil and gas
1

2

3

As of early April, Rystad Energy estimated that worldwide investment in exploration and production
would fall by USD100 billion (20 percent) in 2020 as a result of the COVID-19 crisis and associated
economic impacts. Rystad Energy, COVID-19 Report, Fifth Edition, 7 April 2020), p.42. New producer
governments have expressed significant uncertainty associated with how to attract investment in the
face of the energy transition. See, for example, Libby George, “African Oil States Offer New Deals to
Lure More Selective Investors,” Reuters, 11 November 2019, af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/
idAFKBN1XL1F7-OZABS.
Valérie Marcel, Fostering Resilience in Emerging Oil Producers: Responding to COVID-19 and Preparing
for the Energy Transition, Chatham House, 2020, www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/202012/2020-12-15-fostering-resilience-in-emerging-oil-producers-marcel.pdf_0.pdf. Sixty-seven percent
of new producer government representatives who participated in a March 2020 survey—near the
beginning of pandemic-induced lockdowns—reported that their countries had experienced delays to
final investment decisions or work plans; 50 percent reported lower licensing interest and 43 percent
reported companies seeking to change terms.
See, for example, Damian Carrington, Jillian Ambrose and Matthew Taylor, “Will the Coronavirus
Kill the Oil Industry and Help Save the Climate?” The Guardian, 1 April 2020; Reuters, “Pandemic
Brings Forward Predictions for Peak Oil Demand,” 27 November 2020, www.reuters.com/article/
us-oil-demand-factbox/factbox-pandemic-brings-forward-predictions-for-peak-oil-demandidUSKBN2870NY. Filipe Barbosa, Giorgio Bresciani, Pat Graham, Scott Nyquist and Kassia Yanosek “Oil
and Gas after COVID-19: The Day of Reckoning or a New Age of Opportunity?”McKinsey Insights, 15
May 2020, www.mckinsey.com/industries/oil-and-gas/our-insights/oil-and-gas-after-covid-19-theday-of-reckoning-or-a-new-age-of-opportunity. Half of the new producer officials who participated in a
discussion of the impacts of the pandemic in March 2020 believed that global peak demand had been
reached, as per Marcel, 2020.
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companies into uncharted territory—to a position enabling them to take a tougher
stance in laws and negotiations for new projects going forward. The logic was
based on a reduction of geological risk. After a discovery demonstrates a viable
hydrocarbon deposit, oil companies and investors would perceive the investments
necessary for exploration as less risky. In theory, this should enable governments to
interest companies in investing, even with terms more favorable to the country—
higher taxes, a larger share of equity or profit oil or gas, fewer or shorter tax holidays
or tighter requirements from companies in a post-discovery world.
In this paper we examine whether this theory has borne out in practice. This
question has traditionally been difficult to answer systematically, because the
terms of contracts signed between governments and oil companies have been
secret. However, the growing norm of contract transparency has created new
opportunities to see what terms parties have agreed.4 At least 44 countries now
publish their contracts with companies for natural resource exploitation or licenses
they grant, and 27 have laws in place making this publication mandatory.5
We looked across more than 1,500 hydrocarbons contracts between companies
and host governments available on www.resourcecontracts.org,6 seeking examples
of countries that had published contracts signed both before and after making
discoveries that changed the country’s oil and gas prospects. We identified eight
such countries, for which we analyzed a total of 26 contracts before their discovery
events and 25 subsequent contracts.

The Resource Contracts Database
The contracts analyzed in this document were gathered from the Resource Contracts
database, available at www.resourcecontracts.org. The database is the world’s largest
repository of publicly available oil, gas and mineral contracts. As of January 2022,
the database housed more than 2,700 contracts and associated documents from
97 countries.
Among the tools available on the Resource Contracts site are options to filter and
sort documents by contract type, country, company or date. The contracts are fully
searchable, facilitating the cross-country analysis featured in this report.

Our review of available contracts and their domestic governing laws suggests that
the evidence is mixed for whether new-producer governments exert more leverage
in contracts with oil companies after a significant discovery. Three of the eight
countries in our sample—Ghana, Uganda and Mozambique—demonstrated an
unequivocal pattern in the direction of more stringent terms in the post-discovery
contracts, with clear steps to increase contractors’ obligations to the state and no
significant terms that became less stringent. This suggests that these countries took
advantage of the post-discovery opportunities and their increased leverage in the
marketplace. The other countries in our sample demonstrated mixed results, with
post-discovery contracts becoming more stringent in some areas and less stringent
in others.
4
5
6

Open Contracting Partnership and Natural Resource Governance Institute, Open Contracting for Oil,
Gas and Mineral Rights: Shining a Light on Good Practice, June 2018, resourcegovernance.org/sites/
default/files/documents/open-contracting-for-oil-and-gas-mineral-rights.pdf.
See Natural Resource Governance Institute, Contract Disclosure Practice and Policy, docs.google.
com/spreadsheets/d/1FXEeD43jw6VYHV8yS-8KJ5-rR5l0XtKxVQZBWzr-ohY/edit#gid=0.
ResourceContracts.org is an open database of over 2,000 extractive sector contracts and associated
documents.
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We did not construct detailed models of these individual contracts to attempt to
assess whether a specific post-discovery contract was on balance “better” for the
state. But examining the direction of travel in these cases illustrates that some
governments did not meaningfully alter their approach to gain greater concessions
from their company partners. This demonstrates that there is not a predictable or
linear path from being perceived as a frontier petroleum state to a mature producer.
In some cases, this could be because the government did not take advantage of its
newfound post-discovery leverage. In others, it could be because the leverage did
not materialize—because geology proved disappointing after initial excitement,
global market shifts impacted investor confidence or internal political dynamics
steered the government toward other priorities.
These questions are even more challenging today than they were a decade ago, as
countries that once expected to be on the cusp of major oil or gas revenues face an
accelerating global transition away from fossil fuels. On one hand, governments
face pressure from investors to grant pro-company incentives in order to lower
production costs, maintain non-competitive activities and attract ever-scarcer
investment. However, this risks negotiations becoming a “race to the bottom” that
does not serve the long-term national interest. On the other hand, governments are
appropriately wrestling with economic concerns about the perils of fossil-fuel-led
development in an era in which the sector faces long-term decline.
In this brief, we invite policymakers in new producer countries to reflect on the
experience of countries negotiating in what they thought was a boom time, as they
make difficult decisions about how they want to engage with the sector in an era
with significantly greater uncertainty. Drawing lessons from these experiences in
the petroleum sector may also inform governments’ policy and negotiating practice
as they consider opportunities in the booming energy transition sector, including
clean-technology minerals, climate-smart agriculture, renewable energy and green
hydrogen.
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1. Context: Major discoveries
in unexpected places
The high commodity price era starting in the early 2000s fueled a wave of oil and
gas exploration around the world. Across Africa and in Latin America this led to
multiple oil and gas finds, which in turn encouraged further exploration and interest
in developing them.7 As a result, various countries went from being resource-poor
or frontier countries to “prospective exporters” or “emerging producers” of oil and
gas.8
In conducting this analysis, we looked only at countries which had no or only
modest oil and gas discoveries to start with. In each of these countries, we identified
one key trigger event—the announcement of a specific discovery or sequence of
discoveries—that led to a significant shift in the conversation and expectations
regarding oil or gas prospects in the country. Shortly after these trigger events,
companies, governments and international experts started planning for the quick
expansion of petroleum sector investment and, in many cases, production.
These events, shown in Table 1 below, are either a first discovery or, in several cases,
discoveries classed as “giant,” substantially larger than the previous petroleum
finds in the country combined.9 We focus on the discovery event, rather than on
the declaration of commerciality, which often takes years to establish in a newproducer context, where costs of production are unknown.10 In retrospect, not all
the discoveries prove equally lucrative. The fields discovered in Ghana and Guyana
are producing and were followed by many more finds, whereas the discovery
announcement in Liberia, while initially seen as promising, turned out to be
inflated, and exploration in the country was abandoned a few years later.
For each of these eight countries, we provide further details below on the discovery
and its aftermath and discuss why the discovery can be treated as a trigger event.

7
8

AAPG Datapages: Giant Oil and Gas Fields of the World 2000-2010.
David Mihalyi and Thomas Scurfield, How Did Africa’s Prospective Petroleum Producers Fall Victim to
the Presource Curse? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 9384, 2020, documents1.worldbank.
org/curated/en/274381599578080257/pdf/How-Did-Africas-Prospective-Petroleum-Producers-FallVictim-to-the-Presource-Curse.pdf.
9 In Mihalyi and Scurfield (2020), we show that the new finds increase volumes of oil and gas discovered
at least fourfold (Senegal) and over tenfold in the other cases listed. A giant discovery is one exceeding
500 million barrels (mbbl) and giant fields are those with estimated ultimate recoverable reserves of
500 mbbl of oil or gas equivalent. See M.K. Horn, Giant Oil and Gas Fields of the World, 2011, edx.netl.
doe.gov/dataset/aapg-datapages-giant-oil-and-gas-fields-of-the-world.
10 Though these initial discoveries were followed by subsequent appraisal drillings, rarely have the
companies squarely pronounced these finds as commercial or non-commercial when announcing the
appraisal results.
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Country

Date

Ghana

June
2007

Guyana

Field/ Block
and well

Discovery type

Company

Announcements

Jubilee
(Mahagony-1
well)

First giant
discovery

Kosmos
Energy

Link

May
2015

Liza (Liza-1)

First giant
discovery

ExxonMobil

Link

Kenya

March
2012

Block 10BB
(Ngamia-1)

First discovery

Tullow

Link

Liberia

November
2011

LB-15
(Montserrado-1)

First discovery
(ultimately
proved noncommercial, so
referred to as
“announcement”
in the analysis)

Anadarko

Link

Mauritania

May
2001

Chinguetti
(Chinguetti-1)

First discovery

Woodside
Petroleum

Link

Mozambique

February
2010

Area 1
(Windjammer
well)

First giant
discovery

Anadarko

Link

Senegal

October
2014

SNE (FAN-1 well)

First giant
discovery

Cairn
Energy

Link

Uganda

January
2006

Block 2
(Mputa-1)

First discovery

Tullow

Link

11 The table above is limited to countries in which we found publicly available oil and gas contracts that
were signed both prior to and post the discovery event.
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2. Factors impacting government
leverage after a discovery
GEOLOGICAL RISK
Oil and gas contracts sit within a wider legal framework governing the relationship
between the state—often including a state-owned oil company—and private
companies that bring capital and technology to explore and extract oil deposits. In
some countries, such contracts serve as the specific application of the legislative
or regulatory framework, with contracts hewing closely to the standardized set of
rules. In other countries, however, contracts may either deviate significantly from
legislation or regulations, or establish rules at a much greater level of detail than is
contained in the general framework.12
Decisions about the provisions of a specific contract are generally reached via
a process of competitive bidding or negotiation. Some governments negotiate
contracts directly with an individual company, either on a “first come, firstserved” basis or after the government has publicized a willingness to open certain
petroleum blocs for negotiation. In other cases, governments organize competitive
processes for allocating the rights to explore in a particular bloc and to extract any oil
or gas eventually discovered. The perceived benefits of a competitive approach are
that it gives the government the ability to choose the best-qualified partner and that
by requiring companies to compete against each other, the government maximizes
its chances of getting the best possible deal for the state. In both direct negotiations
and competitive processes, the state may standardize many terms in accordance
with the generally applicable framework, sometimes using a model contract as a
starting point, and set a limit as to which issues are open for negotiation.13
A critical feature of the overwhelming majority of petroleum contracts—
concessions and production-sharing contracts—is that they are signed before
the company has begun exploration in earnest. This means that the contracts are
designed to cover scenarios in which no resource is ever discovered and those in
which there are commercial petroleum deposits. This has important implications
for the content of contracts. First, almost all oil and gas contracts contain terms
covering the conduct of parties during the exploration phase and governing their
rights and responsibilities in the event of a commercial discovery. In theory, this
helps both parties set expectations and safeguard the benefits of their good fortune

12 This can happen because legislation or regulation is not considered well-adapted to evolving market
or industry conditions, or because investors signal that mandatory rules are insufficiently attractive.
The systems in some countries (including Ghana and Liberia) require parliamentary ratification of
natural resource contracts negotiated by the executive, which can serve to establish contracts as a
sort of specialized law applying to a particular project.
13 For an overview of key factors in the contract process, see Natural Resource Governance Institute,
Granting Rights to Natural Resources, March 2015, resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/
documents/nrgi_primer_granting-rights.pdf.

10

New Producer Contract Terms and Uncertainty: Lessons From the Recent Past

if they make a discovery, reducing the risk of the “obsolescing bargain”, whereby a
state unilaterally imposes stricter conditions once a company has already sunk large
expenditures into exploration.14
Second, the parties’ assumptions at the time of contract signature about the
likelihood that a discovery will be made is a key determinant of how much a
company is willing to commit to paying the government in the event of a discovery,
and how much a government will accept. Other factors being equal, the more likely
a company considers it that exploration of a particular bloc will lead to production,
the more willing the company may be to share the proceeds of any eventual success.
Where a project is seen as inordinately risky, with wells drilled likely to be dry,
many companies will insist on an extremely attractive contract package in order to
compensate for their upfront risk.15
Table 2 helps us examine how geological risks impact countries’ bargaining leverage
at different stages of their petroleum-sector lifecycle. In geological plays seen as
“frontier,” generally meaning where there has not been a discovery of commercially
viable oil or there has not been extensive exploration and drilling,16 only eight percent
of wells resulted in a commercial discovery, compared to over 30 percent in wells
drilled in plays that are proven to be commercial. The finding costs tend to be lowest,
and the returns to the explorer highest, in the “emerging” phase immediately after a
new play has been found, when the biggest oil discoveries are typically made.
Frontier

Emerging

Maturing

Mature

Commercial success rate

8%

32%

32%

35%

Drilling cost, $/barrel of oil equivalent (boe)

1.6

0.6

1.5

1.7

Conventional wisdom calls for countries to take as strong a line as they can when
negotiating with oil companies, and to select companies by competitive auction
whenever possible.18 However, understanding the amount of leverage a country has in
practice can be difficult, and if a government is too tough in the presence of high risk
(geological, market or political), there is a chance that it will fail to attract companies
to invest. These risks weigh heavily on policymakers in countries whose geology is
completely unproven, in light of the low rates of success and high costs of exploration.

14 For a discussion of obsolescing bargain risk (and alternative theoretical lenses on oil contract
negotiations), see Vlado Vivoda, “Bargaining Model for the International Oil Industry,” Business
and Politics 13, no. 4 (2011). Many oil contracts contain “stabilization clauses,” which protect
companies against legal changes taking place after the contract is signed. These clauses may provide
for freezing some or all legislative terms at the time of contract signature, so that subsequent
legislative changes enacted in the country are not binding on the contract parties regarding the
project at issue. They may also provide for renegotiation or some form of compensation to restore
the economic balance between the parties after changes in law affect that balance. For a sample of
stabilization clauses across more than 100 oil and gas contracts, see resourcecontracts.org/search/
group?q=&resource%5B%5D=Hydrocarbons&key_clause%5B%5D=Stabilization.
15 Peter D. Cameron and Michael C. Stanley, “Fiscal Regime Design and Administration,” Oil, Gas and
Mining: A Sourcebook for Understanding Extractive Industries, World Bank: 2017, 149-150.
16 Dev George, “National Energy Demands, Desire to Export, Maturing Plays Driving Frontier Exploration,”
Offshore, 1 April 1996.
17 Richmond Energy Partners, Westwood Wildcat Database.
18 The Natural Resource Charter suggests, “Well-designed auctions are preferable [to individual
negotiations] since competitive bidding should secure greater value for the country and auctions
can also help overcome information deficits that the government may have relative to international
companies.” Natural Resource Governance Institute, Natural Resource Charter, Second Edition, 2014,
resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/NRCJ1193_natural_resource_charter_19.6.14.pdf.
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rates and drilling cost,
2010-201417
Source: Westwood Wildcat Database
based on sample of 3,900 wells
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A sensitivity to risk calls for a nuanced approach to establishing licensing processes
and setting contract terms. The New Petroleum Producers Discussion Group—
which has gathered experiences from emerging oil and gas producers around the
world—recommends in its Guidelines for Good Governance in Emerging Oil
and Gas Producers that countries consider a staged approach. During the period
before a first significant commercial discovery, the guidelines recommend that a
country invest in understanding its geology, developing institutions and reaching
out to investors. Where there is significant investor interest, a frontier country
may organize a bidding round, but when geology is uncertain it may be necessary
to engage in direct negotiations. The guidelines advise against rushing to award
licenses at all costs in times of low investor interest or low geological knowledge, to
reduce the risk that highly prospective areas will be governed by disadvantageous
terms or placed in the hands of companies without strong ability to explore.
Nonetheless, they acknowledge that in some cases governments have felt pressure
to give up on tough fiscal terms or exploration requirements during the prediscovery “frontier” period.19
After a discovery, the government and the market have additional information on
the country’s geology that should, in principle, “increase a country’s attractiveness
to investors,” and “can lead to a surge in exploration interest from oil companies.”20
Moving from the frontier stage to the emerging stage, with its corresponding
reduction in risk and cost, should increase the scope for competition among
potential investors and allow the government to achieve more favorable terms.
Of course, the evolution of a contracting approach is more complex than a binary
pre- and post-discovery system. Many advisors counsel that even in a pre-discovery
time period, governments should focus on progressive fiscal terms, which allow
companies to invest without severe risk of over-taxation of unsuccessful or
expensive projects, but give the government a growing share of financial benefits in
the event of a profitable project.21 On the other side of the ledger, even once there
has been a commercial discovery, investor interest can be negatively impacted by
perceived political risk or other factors. The transformation in terms from pre- to
post-discovery would therefore likely never be guaranteed.

19 Valérie Marcel, Guidelines for Good Governance in Emerging Oil and Gas Producers 2016, Chatham
House, July 2016, www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2016-07-13guidelines-good-governance-2016-marcel.pdf, 17-21. NRGI is a core organizing partner of the New
Producers Project, in collaboration with Chatham House and the Commonwealth Secretariat.
20 Marcel, Guidelines for Good Governance in Emerging Oil and Gas Producers 2016, 23.
21 Carole Nakhle, “Petroleum Fiscal Systems: Evolution and Challenges,” in Philip Daniel, Michael Keen
and Charles McPherson, eds., The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, Problems and
Practice, London: Routledge, 2020, 89-120.
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POLITICAL RISK
Politics plays a critical role in the equation, complicating any attempt at neat
narratives in terms of what “tends to happen” post-discovery. High public
expectations are an important factor. On one hand, increased public expectations
can generate pressure on governments to demonstrate strength through improved
terms. Political pressure is not one-directional, however, and discoveries can lead to
factionalism and the pursuit of narrow interests that can impede well-coordinated
and strategic government action. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the
political determinants of the contract outcomes in our sample countries, but it is
important to note the salience of these factors.
Despite these complicating factors, the potential for a change in leverage is strong.
Governments have cited the importance of taking a stronger, forward-looking
approach to contracting in the aftermath of a discovery.22 So too have oil companies,
which have cited the special risks existent in frontier settings as a justification for
needing more incentives pre-discovery than would subsequently be required.23
Third-party analysts also recognize that the fairness of contracts signed prediscovery needs to be assessed differently from the terms of contracts signed after a
country’s petroleum has been proved.24

22 The government of Guyana, for example, announced plans to change the terms applying to new
oil contracts in the wake of the country’s major offshore discoveries. See “Guyana Holds off on
New Licensing Pending Seismic,” Argus Media, 22 November 2019, www.argusmedia.com/en/
news/2021258-guyana-holds-off-on-new-licensing-pending-seismic. Tanzania and Ghana both revised
their legislation governing oil and gas relationships with contractors in the wake of their discoveries.
23 Deloitte, Stabilization Clauses in International Petroleum Agreements: Illusion or Safeguard? April
2014. Tullow’s Head of Media Relations exhibited the views of many oil companies in relation to their
project in Guyana, stating “What I can say is that our licence is entirely in line with licences around the
world in frontier exploration areas. Don’t forget that the Jethro well had a one in four chance of success
at our risk.”
24 See, for example, Johnny West, Stabroek Oil Field, Guyana, Open Oil, March 2018, openoil.net/wp/
wp-content/uploads/2016/12/oo_gy_stabroek_narrative_v1.0_180315_1025_jw.pdf In analyzing
the contract governing Guyana’s first major oil field, the author explicitly compares its fiscal terms
against those of “seven other frontier province projects.” See also David Manley and Thomas
Lassourd, Tanzania and Statoil: What Does the Leaked Agreement Mean for Citizens? August 2014,
resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/Tanzania_Statoil_20140808.pdf
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3. Methodology
In order to assess how much the theory explored above is reflected in practice, we
analyzed select fiscal and operational terms in publicly available petroleum contracts
to see whether governments have leveraged the perceived change in exploration
risk after a key discovery event to negotiate more state-friendly contracts for other
blocks. We also considered whether there were any changes in petroleum and tax
laws which in turn altered the rules applying to the contracted projects. As part of
this process, we examined whether contracts signed after a change in law reflected
the relevant legislative changes. This aimed to capture higher government leverage
expressed in the laws, rather than in contracts.
Table 3 below lists the fiscal and operational terms we considered in our analysis of
each country’s contracts – and laws, where applicable – and explains what kinds of
changes in these terms lead to more onerous investor obligations.25

Category

Operational

Fiscal

Term type

What would it mean for the
term to become more onerous
for the investor?

Table 3. Fiscal and
operational terms
assessed in contract
analysis

Why would the state pursue such a change?

Relinquishment of portions of the
oil block back to the state

A higher percentage of land to
give up (“relinquish”) after the first
exploration phase or across all
phases

Accelerates the investment program and
reduces the possibility of speculation

Duration of first “exploration
period”—the time during which
the company is required to carry
out exploration activities

Shortening of first exploration
period

Accelerates the investment program and
reduces the possibility of speculation

Minimum expenditure for first
period of exploration

Increase in the amount required to
be spent on exploration

Requires companies to invest more in
exploration activities and reduces the possibility
of speculation. In addition, robust work
obligations mean that even on relinquished parts,
governments can gain valuable geological and
geophysical data that can be used in the future.

Stabilization clause

Suppression of the clause or
reduction in scope and time

A stabilization clause enables the terms of
the contracts to survive any change in law, in
particular those unfavorable to the investor.
Removing or reducing the benefits of the clause
increases the state’s ability to make changes as
circumstances evolve.

Income tax

Higher tax rate

Increases the share of revenues to the state in
the event of production

Exemption to income tax

Lower or fewer exemptions

Increases the share of revenues to the state in
the event of production

Royalty

Higher royalty rate or higher royalty
base

Increases the share of revenues to the state in
the event of production

Profit oil

Higher allocation of profit oil to
the state in production-sharing
contracts

Increases the share of oil (in kind or in cash) to
the state in the event of production

Cost oil

Lower share of oil that can be
retained or sold by the investor
to recoup costs (i.e., lower cost oil
“ceiling” or cap)

Diminishes the amount of gross revenue that
could be used to cover costs, or the amount of
cost that is recoverable. Consequently, a lower
cost oil limit increases the tranche of gross
revenues that remain with the government.25

25 The biggest impact is in the early years of production. If there is no limit (i.e., 100 percent cost
recovery), there will not be revenue flowing to the government during those years, which is often
politically problematic.
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Category

Term type

What would it mean for the
term to become more onerous
for the investor?

Why would the state pursue such a change?

Bonus (signature and production)

Higher amount

Increases revenue to the state from the project

State equity

Higher percentage of equity
to the state or more generous
terms accorded to state equity
(e.g., investor “carries” state
share through exploration or
development phase, with a carry
interest rate lower than the
project’s internal rate of return,
which will lower the investor’s
returns)

Increases state control over project and can also
increase financial benefits that accrue to the
state

Contribution to community

Higher amount in monetary terms
or greater obligations

Increases direct financial contribution of oil
and gas project to neighboring communities or
municipalities

Local content

Higher requirements for the
share or amount that investors
must allocate to train or hire local
professionals or firms (although
unless penalties for default are very
dissuasive, many investors would
not see these as material)

Increases the impact that the project can have
on local markets

Fiscal

For each country, we divided the contracts into two groups: those entered into
before the discovery event and those entered into after it (see Table 1 on discovery
events). We also differentiated contracts by their location across basins and specified
the type of play (onshore, offshore shallow water, offshore deep water). Looking
only at the upstream levels, onshore locations are usually the least costly to exploit,
followed by offshore shallow water and finally offshore deep water. While in
theory onshore fields might present a lower cost of extraction than offshore fields,
and therefore more leeway for governments to tighten the terms, some onshore
fields are associated with long and expensive pipelines. This makes them costlier
and more subject to community disruption, so the type of play should be analyzed
carefully.
Wherever possible, we focused our analysis on contracts located in or as near as
possible to the geological basin where the discovery was made. Where relevant, we
also looked at the other basins to understand if there was a knock-on effect, with
some transmission of the pattern in contract terms to other basins. We also looked
for any material changes in the contract area sizes (where available) and explained
any observed change over time that may impact the analysis.
In analyzing the evolution of the operational and fiscal terms in pre-discovery
contracts and post-discovery contracts, we drew conclusions on whether there was
a “pattern” that supports the theory that if a country’s geological attractiveness has
been evidenced by a commercial discovery, the government may be in a stronger
position to negotiate fiscal and operational terms more advantageous to the state.
We distinguish between:
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“Clear pattern of more stringent terms”: A country is characterized as having
a consistent pattern where we observed overall consistency across terms and
contracts pointing towards the strengthening of fiscal and operational terms from
the state’s perspective, with little evidence of significant regression of terms. Such
a designation does not mean that all relevant terms in the contract became more
advantageous for the state. Within this category, some countries display a clearer
pattern than others, but all exhibit clear movement in one direction.
“No clear pattern”: A country is characterized as having no clear pattern either
where we observed contract shifts in both directions (some terms becoming more
stringent to the investor, others less so), or where there were a small number of
minor changes that seem unlikely to meaningfully impact the balance of benefits
and obligations. Assessing the overall direction of mixed changes in contract terms
would have required modeling each contract based on questionable assumptions
(especially on geology) and is beyond the scope of this analysis. We erred on the side
of caution and put all contracts in this group where a clear judgement of direction
could not be made based on a review of terms alone.
“Clear pattern of less stringent terms”: A country is characterized as having a
clear pattern of less stringent terms where we observed overall consistency across
contracts, pointing towards fiscal and operational terms weakening from the state’s
perspective. Interestingly, we did not find any such cases in our sample.
For ease of reference, each contract reviewed is numbered in the text. The full names
of all the contracts included in our analysis, along with links to each contract, are
listed in the Annex, with the corresponding number reference.

METHODOLOGICAL CAVEATS
This analysis offers an imperfect account of an observed correlation between
significant discovery events and changes in contract terms in the same country,
and does not purport to prove direct causation. We observe the following caveats
as to whether these findings can be further generalized. First, our review is limited
to publicly available contracts, whose terms may differ from non-public ones.26
Second, we did not review how contracts changed in all other countries across the
same volatile years.27 Third, the sample of contracts is relatively small, and there
is a degree of uncertainty as to contract negotiation timelines, which disrupts the
true understanding of the timeline.28 Fourth, we did not model the contract terms
to systematically analyze the total impact of changes in terms of estimated returns
to the state across a range of production and cost assumptions. Similarly, we did
not review the extent of loopholes in the fiscal regimes (related to transfer pricing,
thin capitalization, ringfencing or cost recovery and tax deductibility rules), which
26 According to our research, among the countries reviewed, Ghana, Guyana, Liberia, Mozambique and
Senegal have systematically published their petroleum contracts.
27 We note that even though the 2014 oil price crash affected contract terms globally (see
resourcegovernance.org/blog/taxing-question-arises-when-commodity-prices-fall), the analyzed
contracts in this paper do not lend themselves to a clear interpretation of the impact of the crash.
28 According to an oil expert, contract negotiation in relation to a significant discovery in a frontier
country could take roughly between 6 and 12 months. This duration will depend on several factors,
such as whether the country has a model contract, whether the host government has hired outside
advisors, whether the negotiation site is logistically hard to reach, how well organized the host
government is, how easy it is to get decisions made and whether parliamentary approval is required
for the agreement.

16

New Producer Contract Terms and Uncertainty: Lessons From the Recent Past

can considerably impact the performance of a fiscal instrument. Our observations
are therefore limited to the directional pattern among the identified terms, and do
not allow us to assess the magnitude of changes observed. Fifth, we did not review
amendments to contracts or renegotiated contracts, in order to avoid mixing the
types of situations analyzed. This was especially because a renegotiation remains
tied to the economic equilibrium agreed in the original contract, where some form
of stabilization clause was included. Renegotiation of a contract where a discovery
has been made also differs from the negotiation of subsequent contracts for
neighboring petroleum blocs, because in the former, the geological risk has been
demonstrably removed by the discovery, whereas in the latter, risk remains present,
though reduced.
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4. Evidence from available contracts
GHANA: CLEAR PATTERN OF MORE STRINGENT TERMS
Oil was discovered and has been produced in small quantities in Ghana since the
1970s.29 But the country’s game-changing Jubilee oil field was discovered by a
Kosmos-led joint venture in June 2007 (Mahagony-1 well). The field’s significance
was confirmed two months later by the drilling of a second exploration well by
Tullow (Hyedua-1) on the adjacent oil block. Further appraisal wells drilled in
2008 confirmed that the Jubilee field was a giant, with over 500 million barrels in
reserves, and commercially viable.
We analyzed eight Ghanaian contracts,30 the earliest signed in 2004 (we designate
this contract “Ghana 1,” and name the other contracts accordingly) and the latest
dated 2015 (Ghana 8). Two of these contracts are dated 1-3 years before the
giant Jubilee field discovery (Ghana 1 and 2), and six are dated 1-8 years after the
discovery (Ghana 3-8). The contracts signed a year before the discovery and a year
after the discovery concerned license areas that include the Jubilee field, and the
rest of the contracts reviewed largely concern blocks in the same basin as the Jubilee
discovery––the Western Basin—bar two contracts concerning blocks in the Accra/
Keta Basin (Ghana 6 and 7).
Even with this variation, taken together, we observed a clear pattern toward more
stringent contractual terms when comparing contracts signed pre-discovery
and those signed post-discovery. The contracts signed post-discovery include
fiscal terms designed to provide stronger returns for the state, suggesting that the
government sought to take advantage of the country’s decreased risk profile to
negotiate more advantageous fiscal terms. For example, we observed clear increases
in royalty rates (with the royalty base remaining the same) and improvement in the
progressivity of the additional oil entitlement (AOE)31 when comparing contracts
signed before and after the giant discovery. In addition, we observed increases in
the percentage of state equity in the post-discovery contracts, as well as increases
in the minimum exploration investment commitments. One contract (Ghana 5)—
signed in September 2014, six years after the giant discovery and two months into
the commodity price decline starting in July 2014––stands out. It has the highest
state participation level of the Ghanaian contracts reviewed, and the minimum
exploration investment is 60 percent higher than the next-highest investment
requirement found in the contracts reviewed.

29 The Saltpond Oil Field, Ghana’s oldest, started commercial production in 1978. See The Oil and
Gas Law Review, Edition 6, Ghana, thelawreviews.co.uk/edition/the-oil-and-gas-law-reviewedition-6/1175809/ghana
30 Ghana’s hydrocarbon contracts on resourcecontracts.org, resourcecontracts.org/
search?q=&country%5B%5D=gh&resource%5B%5D=Hydrocarbons
31 Additional Oil Entitlement (AOE) is a type of resource rent tax. It grants Ghana an additional share of
petroleum produced and is computed on the basis of the after-tax inflation-adjusted rate of return
that the contractor achieved in each field. The resource rent tax is an important tax instrument to
collect rent, but is rarely applied. In our sample, only Ghana’s fiscal regime uses a resource rent tax, so
we did not make it a cross-country term to systematically analyze.
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Ghana contracts pre- and post-Jubilee: Key features
• 2007 giant discovery of the Jubilee Oilfield.
•	Our sample contained two contracts signed before the discovery and six signed after
it. Of the post-discovery contracts, one combines onshore and offshore acreage; the
others are offshore.
Category

Operational

Fiscal

Term type

Observation

Relinquishment of portions of the oil
block back to the state

No clear pattern

Duration of first “exploration period”—
the time during which the company
is required to carry out exploration
activities

No clear pattern

Minimum expenditure for first period of
exploration

Expenditure requirements are higher
in post-discovery contracts compared
to pre-discovery contracts, with the
exception of Ghana 6, which dips below
one of the pre-discovery contracts

Stabilization clause

Almost all contracts reviewed
contained stabilization clauses.32 With
the exception of the first contract postdiscovery (Ghana 3), the stabilization
clauses become less absolute
post-discovery33

Income tax

Tax rate remains consistent with
reference to the law

Exemption to income tax

Consistent

Additional profit tax

There is a trend toward more
progressive additional oil entitlements
in the post-discovery contracts

Royalty

Clear increase in royalties (with the
royalty base remaining the same)

Profit oil

N/A

Cost oil

N/A

Bonus (signature and production)

None

State equity

Overall increase in post-discovery
contracts

Contribution to community

Consistent

Local content

Largely consistent

32 Ghana 8 may contain a stabilization clause, but because the copy of the contract was incomplete, we
cannot say for certain.
33 For example, in Ghana 1, which was signed pre-discovery, any attempt to apply a legislative or
administrative act that varies the terms of the contract constitutes a breach of contract, unless the
change in law varies the terms in a way favorable to the contractor, in which case the contractor takes
the benefit of the favorable changes (article 26.3-4). In Ghana 7, which was signed post-discovery, the
contractor must comply with applicable laws, but may request a renegotiation of terms if it considers
that any law, rule or decree that enters into effect after the date of the contract makes performance
impossible or has a material adverse effect on the contractor’s rights, obligations, or economic
benefits under the contract (article 26.2-3).
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UGANDA: CLEAR PATTERN OF MORE STRINGENT TERMS
After nearly a century of intermittent exploration in Uganda, a higher oil price led
to an upturn in activity in the early 2000s.34 Oil was discovered in January 2006,
quickly followed by further discoveries later that year and in subsequent years.
These discoveries were reported as commercial in 2009.35 By 2014, there had been
21 discoveries—all onshore and all within the Albertine Graben.36 At this point, the
Ugandan government increased its estimate of Uganda’s oil in place from 3.5 billion
to 6.5 billion barrels, of which it estimated that 1.4 billion were recoverable.37 The
Ugandan government and its partners encountered years of delay in progressing
these discoveries to development, but in early 2021 the Ugandan government,
Total and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation reached a final investment
decision (FID) to begin developing oil on their Lake Albert project.
We analyzed three publicly available Ugandan contracts, the earliest dated 2004
(Uganda 1) and the two latest both from 2012 (Uganda 2 and 3).38 The contracts
reviewed concern blocks in the area around Lake Albert––the Albertine Graben.
Some terms appear to have become more stringent in the post-discovery contracts.
Most notably, the 2012 contracts include an additional royalty and a new category
of bonus that was not included in the 2004 contract. There was also a significant
reduction in the maximum length of the exploration period compared to the 2004
contract. This contract allows for a maximum exploration period of six years, as also
specified in the law, whereas the 2012 contracts only allow six months and one year,
respectively.
However, we saw no changes in cost recovery limits, state participation or the
percentage of cost and profit oil recovery in the post-discovery contracts. We did
not find evidence that laws of the relevant period determined any of the contractual
provisions we reviewed, except for the maximum length in exploration period,
which applied to all contracts reviewed.39

34 Paul Bagabo and Thomas Lassourd, “Low Oil Prices Impose Difficult Choices in Uganda,” Natural
Resource Governance Institute, 8 June 2015, resourcegovernance.org/blog/low-oil-prices-imposedifficult-choices-uganda.
35 Tullow Oil, “Tullow in Uganda,” www.tullowoil.com/our-operations/africa/uganda/.
36 Directorate of Petroleum, Government of Uganda “Petroleum Exploration History,” www.petroleum.
go.ug/index.php/who-we-are/who-weare/petroleum-exploration-history
37 Elias Biryabarema, “Uganda Ups Oil Reserves by 85 Percent, Finds Natural Gas,” Reuters, 29 August
2014, www.reuters.com/article/uganda-oil/update-2-uganda-ups-oil-reserves-estimate-by-85-pctfinds-natural-gas-idUSL5N0QZ1EW20140829; International Monetary Fund, Uganda: 2017 Article
IV Consultation and Eighth Review Under the Policy Support Instrument, 2017, www.imf.org/en/
Publications/CR/Issues/2017/07/12/Uganda-2017-Article-IV-Consultation-and-Eighth-ReviewUnder-the-Policy-Support-Instrument-45069.
38 Uganda’s hydrocarbon contracts on resourcecontracts.org, resourcecontracts.org/
search?q=&country%5B%5D=UG&resource%5B%5D=Hydrocarbons
39 While capital gains tax is not among the tax instruments we analyzed, in Uganda this may have been
one vehicle that the government used to exercise increased leverage over time. When Heritage
(Uganda 1) flipped the license to Tullow in 2010, the government forcefully asked for the payment of
capital gains tax. Source: www.acode-u.org/uploadedFiles/infosheet16.pdf
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Uganda contracts pre- and post-discovery: Key features
• Analysis of three contracts dated between 2004 and 2012.
• The first oil discovery was made in 2006, so our sample includes one pre-discovery
contract and two post-discovery contracts.
• The 2004 contract (Uganda 1) used in this analysis is an incomplete version, with
some sections missing from the publicly available version, and some of the contents
of the provisions analyzed were taken from a summary table attached to the
incomplete contract.
Category

Term type

Observation

Operational

Relinquishment of portions of the oil
block back to the state

Not specified in post-discovery
contracts because there is no
possibility of renewal in the later
contracts

Duration of first “exploration period”—
the time during which the company
is required to carry out exploration
activities

Significant reduction in the maximum
length of exploration period in the
2012 contracts compared to the 2004
contract, down from a maximum of six
years in the 2004 contract (allowing
for potentially two renewals) to one
year and six months respectively in the
2012 contracts (which do not allow
for renewal after the first exploration
period)

Minimum expenditure for first period
of exploration

No clear pattern (changes in both
directions)

Stabilization clause

Unclear because of incomplete 2004
contract (Uganda 1)

Income tax

Consistent across contracts (in
accordance with the law)

Exemption to income tax

None

Royalty

Additional royalty in contracts entered
into post-discovery

Profit oil

No pattern in share of profit oil—
largely consistent, with a one
percentage point difference in one
of the 2012 contracts in favor of the
operator (Uganda 3)

Cost oil

Consistent

Bonus (signature and production)

Inclusion of a discovery bonus in 2012
contracts, in addition to the signature
bonus; pre-discovery contracts only
included a signature bonus

State equity

No modifications in state participation

Contribution to community

None

Local content

Increase in training expenditure in one
of the 2012 contracts (Uganda 2). The
local content provision in the other
2012 contract reviewed (Uganda 3) is
identical to the pre-discovery contract.

Fiscal
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MOZAMBIQUE: CLEAR PATTERN OF MORE STRINGENT TERMS
Exploration for oil and gas in Mozambique began in the 1950s and led to the
discovery of gas in the Pande and Temane onshore fields in the 1960s.40 These fields
have been producing relatively modest quantities of gas since 2004. However, it
was Anadarko’s large offshore discovery in the Windjammer well of Area 1 of the
Rovuma Basin in February 2010 that announced Mozambique as a potential largescale gas producer.41 As the company noted in a statement in February 2010, “[t]he
Windjammer discovery de-risks a substantial portion of approximately 50 leads and
prospects that we’ve identified across our 2.6-million-acre position in the basin.”42
This was followed by two further discoveries in Area 1 in 2010, in the Barquentine
and Lagosta wells. After the third discovery, an Anadarko vice-president was quoted
in a press statement as saying that the three discoveries to date were already large
enough to support an LNG project.43 A giant discovery was then made by Eni in
Mamba South 1 in the adjacent Area 4 in October 2011.44 Subsequent discoveries in
Areas 1 and 4 in 2011–2014 saw estimates of recoverable reserves rapidly increase.
Company websites indicate that, to date, an estimated 75 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of
recoverable gas has been discovered in Area 1 and 85 tcf in Area 4 (with a significant
amount of these reserves in fields that straddle the two areas: the MambaProsperidade complex).45 The Energy Information Administration suggests that
around 100 tcf of this gas has the potential to be classified proven (provided they
reach FID stage), meaning that Mozambique’s potential gas reserves would rank
third-largest in Africa (after Nigeria and Algeria).46 The gas find in Area 1 reached an
FID in 2019.47
We analyzed 12 Mozambican contracts48 from 2000 to 2018, covering two basins.
While the first commercial discovery was in the Rovuma Basin, we also assessed
the evolution of terms in contracts concerning the older Pande Temane (PT) Basin,
to understand whether there was a knock-on effect on this other basin.
Mozambique demonstrated a clear overall pattern of more stringent terms across
the two basins, though these seem to have been driven more by legislative changes
that preceded the discovery (but took place after the pre-discovery contracts had
been signed), rather than by a change in the government’s approach to negotiations.
40 National Petroleum Institute of Mozambique, Overview of Oil and Gas in Mozambique, October 2013,
www.esi-africa.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/INP.pdf.
41 Anadarko Petroleum, Anadarko Announces First Deepwater Discovery Offshore Mozambique, 18
February 2010.
42 “This is true rank wildcat exploration, and to have our first deep-water exploration well result in
a discovery with more than 480 net feet of pay, thus far, is a strong indication of the potential of
this basin. The Windjammer discovery de-risks a substantial portion of approximately 50 leads and
prospects that we’ve identified across our 2.6-million-acre position in the basin.” Anadarko Petroleum,
Anadarko Announces First Deepwater Discovery Offshore Mozambique, 18 February 2010.
43 Anadarko Petroleum, Anadarko Announces Discovery Offshore Mozambique, 7 February 2011.
44 Eni, Eni Announces a Giant Gas Discovery Offshore Mozambique, 20 October 2011, www.eni.com/
en_IT/media/2011/10/eni-announces-a-giant-gas-discovery-offshore-mozambique
45 Eni, “Our Work in Mozambique,” www.eni.com/enipedia/en_IT/international-presence/africa/enisactivities-in-mozambique.page, accessed 22 January 2021.
46 Energy Information Administration, “Natural Gas Reserves,” www.eia.gov/beta/international/
rankings/#?prodact=3-6&cy=2017. Proven reserves in Areas 1 and 4 will be slightly less than 100 tcf,
given that this figure includes Pande and Temane’s proven reserves.
47 Eric Yep and Lucy Roux, “Anadarko Reaches FID on 12.88 Mil/mt/year Area 1 Mozambique LNG
Project,” S&P Global, 19 June 2019, www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/
natural-gas/061919-anadarko-reaches-fid-on-1288-mil-mt-year-area-1-mozambique-lng-project.
48 Mozambique’s hydrocarbon contracts on resourcecontracts.org, resourcecontracts.org/
search?q=mozambique&country%5B%5D=MZ&resource%5B%5D=Hydrocarbons.
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Changes to the 2007 petroleum tax law49 eliminated several exemptions to
corporate income tax and increased the royalty burden for all contracts from 2008.
Changes to the petroleum tax law in 2007 and petroleum law in 201450 rendered
the stabilization clause narrower in scope and time. These changes were applied in
the contracts signed after discovery in both basins. `
Other contract changes varied across the two basins. In the Rovuma Basin, the
two post-discovery contracts are from 2018, nine years after the discovery, and
are overall more onerous on the investor than their predecessors. They include the
terms of the new legislation, mentioned above, and contract-specific increases in
the state’s share of profit petroleum, generally stricter rules on cost recovery and
stronger local content provisions. Despite this overall trend toward more stringent
terms, the changes in the Rovuma Basin contracts were not consistent across all the
contracts in the sample. One pre-discovery contract signed with Anadarko on Area
1 (Mozambique 1) was already tough on the investor in 2006 (with the highest
bonus in the sample), and a 2008 contract (Mozambique 4) mandates the highest
profit share for the government for the last three tranches among all contracts.51
The PT Basin contracts similarly reflected the legislative changes and a more
stringent approach to profit and cost petroleum, as well as larger bonuses. It is worth
noting that the 2010 contract (Mozambique 3b) signed seven months after the giant
discovery in the Rovuma Basin, has the toughest profit and cost oil and gas terms
among all contracts reviewed. For this basin, we also observed that the prescription
to pay amounts directly to communities only appears post-discovery. We note that
PT had already proved its commerciality in the 1990s by selling gas to South Africa.
The improvement from the Mozambican government’s perspective of fiscal terms
over time might therefore not be most closely related to Rovuma’s giant discovery,
but rather to the ability of Sasol (the main investor in PT) to leverage its own
investments in the basin, for knowledge, infrastructure and approach to risk.
Mozambique’s model contracts also reflect a trend toward greater stringency. Fewer
terms are negotiable in the 2016 (post-discovery) model contract compared to the
2006 (pre-discovery) model. This is consistent with the hypothesis that states
should be able to exert more control over oil projects after a leverage-increasing
discovery.
We conclude that Mozambique follows a consistent path towards stringency, but
observe that term-strengthening began through legislation that pre-dated the
discovery.

49 Republic of Mozambique, Law No. 13/2007, 27 June 2007, www.acismoz.com/wp-content/
uploads/2017/06/Law-13-2007-tax-incentives-for-mining-and-petroleum.pdf.
50 National Petroleum Institute, Unofficial Translation of Mozambique Petroleum Law, Law No. 27/2014,
September 2014, www.inp-mz.com/core/uploads/Schedule-1-PetLaw-EN.pdf.
51 The first tranche is lower than in later contracts, which can have an important impact on the internal
rate of return of the project, given the time value of money.
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Mozambique contracts pre- and post-Windjammer: Key features
• Analysis among 12 contracts from 2000 to 2018, before and after the giant gas discovery of 2010.
• Our sample included seven pre-discovery contracts and five post-discovery contracts (one
of which was signed in 2010, just seven months after the discovery). Among these are two
model contracts: one pre-discovery, from 2006, and one post-discovery from 2016.
• The 2016 model contract contains fewer terms left open to negotiation than the 2006
model, reflecting reforms enacted in legislation on terms including royalties, income tax
and stabilization.
• The contracts spanned two basins: one off the country’s southern coastline (PT Basin)
and one off the country’s northern coastline (Rovuma).
• Among the Rovuma contracts, our sample included four pre-discovery contracts and
two post-discovery contracts.
Category

Operational

Fiscal

Term type

Observation

Relinquishment of portions of the oil
block back to the state

No clear pattern

Duration of first “exploration period”—
the time during which the company
is required to carry out exploration
activities

Period grew shorter over time

Minimum expenditure for first period of
exploration

No clear pattern

Stabilization clause

Scope limited to fiscal terms (2007
Amendment to Petroleum Tax Law),
and the clause has become optional
since the 2014 Petroleum Law

Income tax or exemption

Over time, there were fewer
exemptions from corporate income
taxes (change driven by the 2007
Amendment to Mozambique’s
Petroleum Tax Law, which impacts our
contract sample from 2008 onwards)

Royalty

Increase in royalties in post-discovery
contracts (change driven by the
2007 Amendment to Mozambique’s
Petroleum Tax Law, which impacts our
contract sample from 2008 onwards)

Profit oil or gas

Overall increase

Cost oil or gas

Stricter in 2018 contracts than
in others (although cost oil in
Mozambique 1 contract is also fairly
stringent, it is less so than in 2018)

Bonus (signature and production)
Continu

No clear pattern (highest bonus across
all contracts in Mozambique 1 contract)

State equity

No pattern. However, the state equity
of the 2018 Mozambique 6 contract52
is the highest across all available
Mozambican contracts

Contribution to community

No clear pattern

Local content

Increased over time (although the
requirements in the Mozambique 1
contract are also strict)
Continued on next page>

52 Both 2018 contracts, Mozambique 5 and 6, were signed in October 2018, so we cannot say that one is
significantly more recent than the other
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Mozambique contracts pre- and post-Windjammer: Key features (continued)
• Among the PT Basin contracts, the sample included two pre-discovery contracts and
two post-discovery contracts. Patterns were as follows:
Category

Operational

Term type

Observation

Relinquishment of portions of the oil
block back to the state

No clear pattern

Duration of first “exploration period”—
the time during which the company
is required to carry out exploration
activities

Period is significantly shorter in the
most recent contract in this basin
(Mozambique 4b)

Minimum expenditure for first period of
exploration

No clear pattern

Stabilization clause

Scope limited to fiscal terms (2007
Amendment to Petroleum Tax Law),
and the clause has become optional
since the 2014 Petroleum Law

Income tax/Exemption to income tax

Over time there were fewer
exemptions from corporate income
taxes (change driven by the 2007
Amendment to Mozambique’s
Petroleum Tax Law, which impacts our
contract sample from 2008 onwards)

Royalty

Increase in royalties in post-discovery
contracts (change driven by the
2007 Amendment to Mozambique’s
Petroleum Tax Law, which impacts our
contract sample from 2008 onwards)

Profit oil or gas

Overall increase in profit oil share to
the state post-discovery, though it
is noteworthy that the requirement
in a 2018 contract was more
investor-friendly than the contract
signed in 2010, just seven months
post-discovery

Cost oil or gas

Grew stricter post-discovery, though it
is noteworthy that the requirement in
a 2018 contract was more investorfriendly than the contract signed in
2010

Bonus (signature and production)

More onerous for investors over time

State equity

No pattern. However, the state equity
of the 2018 Mozambique 4b contract
is the highest across all available
Mozambican contracts

Contribution to community

Only in post-discovery

Local content

No clear pattern

Fiscal
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GUYANA: MIXED (WITH A SIGNIFICANT PRO-GOVERNMENT CHANGE
IN FISCAL TERMS)
Following decades of unsuccessful exploration, a consortium of international oil
companies led by ExxonMobil made an exceptional oil discovery off the coast
of Guyana, announced in May 2015.53 They labelled the so-called Liza field as
“significant” and signalled their commitment to intensify exploration. Drilling
results announced in June 2016 from a second well found further oil and revealed
recoverable resources of about 1 billion barrels. The company labeled the field
“world class.”54
Since this initial discovery, additional drilling activities in the same block have
found more oil in the Payara, Snoek and Turbot fields. By April 2019, the number of
discoveries had reached 13,55 and the estimated reserves stood at 6 billion barrels.56
We analyzed four Guyanese contracts,57 dated from 1999 to 2016. Three of these
relate to projects in deep water (Guyana 1,2 and 4) and one to a project in shallow
water (Guyana 3). In deep water, two are pre-discovery (Guyana 1 and 2) and one is
post-discovery (Guyana 4). In shallow water, the only contract is pre-discovery. We
did not include in our analysis a renegotiated contract that the government signed
with ExxonMobil in 2016, after the Liza discovery, because as explained above in
the methodology, our focus is on the evolution of government practice around the
terms negotiated for new exploration and production contracts in a post-discovery
environment, not on the renegotiation of existing deals.58 While it could have been
interesting to understand if contracts post this renegotiation have incorporated
Exxon’s renegotiated contract changes, we did not have access to contracts signed
after this renegotiation.
The deep-water contracts are overall very similar, though some differ with regards
to profit oil—in particular, the post-discovery 2016 Guyana 4 contract. The prediscovery contracts have a flat profit-oil-sharing structure, whereby the share
accorded to the state is constant irrespective of production. The Guyana 1 contract
(with ExxonMobil for the Liza field) and the Guyana 2 contract both contain a 50-50
split between government and contractor that does not vary based on production.
The shallow-water Guyana 3 contract features a flat 53-47 percent split in favor of
the government, which is understandable, as shallow-water oil is less expensive
to extract and associated contracts generally command tougher terms. The postdiscovery contract, by contrast, contains a 50-50 split for the first 25,000 barrels of
daily production, and gives the government a rising share of profit oil as production
increases, up to a maximum of 60-40 for any production above 80,000 barrels per
53 See Offshore Energy, “ExxonMobil encouraged by oil discovery offshore Guyana,” 21 May 2015,
www.offshoreenergytoday.com/exxonmobil-encouraged-by-oil-discovery-offshore-guyana/.
54 See Offshore Energy, “ExxonMobil hits ‘world-class discovery’ in second well off Guyana,” 30 June
2016, www.offshoreenergytoday.com/exxonmobil-hits-world-class-discovery-in-second-well-offshoreguyana/.
55 Valerie Jones, “Exxon Makes 13th Oil Discovery Offshore Guyana,” Rigzone, 19 April 2019, www.rigzone.
com/news/exxon_makes_13th_oil_discovery_offshore_guyana-19-apr-2019-158645-article/.
56 “Morgan Stanley Pegs Guyana Oil Reserves at 6 Billion Barrels,” Oil Now, 28 May 2019, oilnow.gy/
featured/morgan-stanley-pegs-guyana-oil-reserves-at-6-billion-barrels/.
57 Guyana’s hydrocarbon contracts on resourcecontracts.org, resourcecontracts.org/
search?q=&country%5B%5D=GY&resource%5B%5D=Hydrocarbons.
58 The renegotiated contract, resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-1399550295/view#/.
Among the terms that were revised in the renegotiation were those related to royalties, training
contributions and relinquishment. We also opted not to include the 2015 Kaieteur block contract, as
this was signed less than a month before the commercial discovery announcement was made, which
we deemed too close to confidently categorize as either pre- or post-discovery.
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day. This is an improvement and could potentially bring additional revenues to the
state, though application will depend on how narrowly a field is defined and how
big the production levels are in order for the last tranche to be reached.
Given that the area of this post-discovery Guyana 4 contract is substantially smaller
than the pre-discovery contracts (Guyana 1 and 2), the overall revenues to the state
might not improve. This difference in size is so significant that the more generous
relinquishment obligation in the Guyana 4 contract does not help reduce the gap.
Guyana 4 requires relinquishment of 20 percent of the original contract area by the
end of the seventh contract year, compared to relinquishment of 50 and 25 percent
of the initial contract area, less any discovery areas, in Guyana 1 and 2 contracts
respectively.
In addition, the training contributions required of contractors were also reduced to a
non-material amount in post-discovery Guyana 4. The law59 does not seem to have
determined the contractual terms analyzed, as it dates back to 1986, was amended
in 1992 and only vaguely formulates these terms.
Taking all elements of this analysis into account, we have observed a mixed
situation in Guyana. On balance, the government-friendly changes to the profit oil
split seem likely to be more significant in fiscal revenues than the changes to the
relinquishment or training provisions. However, given the small contract area in
Guyana 4, the impact remains to be seen. We note that granting small-area contracts
is an improvement in itself for the government, as this improves its leverage and
control.60

59 Guyana Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 1986, parliament.gov.gy/documents/acts/8170-act_
no._3_of_1986_petroleum_(exploration_and_production)_act_1986.pdf; Guyana Petroleum (Exploration
and Production) Act 1986 (Amendment) Act 1992, http://parliament.gov.gy/documents/acts/58834_of_1992_petroleum_(exploration_and_production)_act_1986(amendment)_act_1992.pdf.
60 “[I]f the license area is very large (like the Exxon’s Guyana Stabroek block[1] comprising 26,800 square
kilometers) then the power of the IOC [international oil company] becomes even greater. This is
because they have the freedom to choose to explore a wide range of prospects in diverse geologic
trends within that block without necessarily having to seek government approvals to proceed. The
IOC also can “hold” the exploration license longer by exploring a relatively small part of such a large
block.” Thomas Mitro, Columbia Center for Sustainable Investment, forthcoming 2021.
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Guyana contracts pre- and post-Liza: Key features
•

Analysis among four contracts from 1999 to 2016.

• Giant discovery in 2015.
• Analysis of two pre-discovery contracts, one post-discovery for deep water and one
pre-discovery in shallow water.
Category

Operational

Term type

Observation

Relinquishment of portions of the oil
block back to the state

Guyana 4 is more advantageous to the
contractor than the other contracts
in either deep or shallow water, but
the contract area is much smaller, so
impact is limited.

Duration of first “exploration period”—
the time during which the company
is required to carry out exploration
activities

Consistent

Minimum expenditure for first period
of exploration

No clear pattern

Stabilization clause

Consistent

Income tax

Consistent and paid from government
share

Exemption to income tax

None

Royalty

Constant and paid from government
share

Profit oil

The post-discovery contract in deep
water is on paper more onerous on
the investor, but the revenue impact
might be limited by the size of the
block; the pre-discovery shallow water
contract also shows a less investorfriendly profit sharing

Cost oil

Consistent

Bonus (signature and production)

None

State equity

None

Contribution to community

None

Local content

In deep water, obligations are lower in
post-discovery contracts than in prediscovery ones, but the shallow-water
contract shows the highest amount
in training contribution among all
contracts

Fiscal
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MAURITANIA: MIXED
In May 2001, Woodside discovered the Chinguetti oil field in deep water off
Mauritania by the Chinguetti-1 well.61 This discovery paved the way for further
exploration and discoveries.62 The Banda (2002), Pelican (2003), Tiof (2003) and
Tevet (2004) gas finds followed. Chinguetti was declared commercially viable in June
2004, and Woodside announced it would invest $600 million to develop the field.63
The company successfully reached first oil in 2006, as planned. It is worth noting that
the Chinguetti field proved disappointing from a commercial perspective. It produced
at much lower levels than had been anticipated and is now being decommissioned.
The country is currently awaiting production from the much larger (giant) Grand
Tortue/Ahmeyim (GTA) field (2015), shared with Senegal.
We analyzed seven Mauritanian contracts64 from 1999 to 2016, all in deep water.
Two are pre-discovery and five are post-discovery. We observed a pattern of larger
bonus requirements in contracts after discovery, beginning with a contract signed
in 2007 that introduced a signature bonus and higher production bonus tranches
(Mauritania 4). Interestingly, the highest bonus comes with the 2016 Mauritania 7
contract, which has the smallest area among all contracts. The country also required
higher minimum investment expenditures in the post-discovery period than the
pre-discovery contracts (though among the post-discovery contracts, there is no
clear pattern over time). Beginning with the 2012 contract (Mauritania 5), the scope
of the stabilization clause is reduced, so that it only covers fiscal terms.65
Beyond the bonus and minimum expenditure provisions, we did not observe a
clear pattern for other provisions in the Mauritanian contracts post-discovery.
Some terms became less stringent on investors, which might be explained by the
fact that Chinguetti ended up being disappointing. Therefore we conclude that
overall, Mauritania follows a mixed path. Regarding profit oil, cost oil, state equity
and income tax rate, we did not observe conclusive changes. While the 2006 postdiscovery contract (Mauritania 3) is similar to the pre-discovery contracts, the
2007 contract (Mauritania 4) is the most onerous on the investor across all available
Mauritanian contracts vis-a-vis fiscal terms.
Among the contracts signed from 2012 onwards, we observed both a
harmonization of terms and investor-friendly changes when it comes to profit oil
(which transitions from being allocated according to production levels to being
allocated based on profitability in 2012), income tax rate, state equity and duration
of first exploration period. However, changes for cost oil were less favorable to
investors. Part of this harmonization was driven by the 2010 Petroleum Law,66
which set the maximum cost oil, maximum duration of exploration period and
61 “Mauritania Moves Closer to First Oil,” Offshore, 1 April 2004, www.offshore-mag.com/geosciences/
article/16759807/mauritania-drilling-campaign-indicates-emerging-deepwater-province www.
offshore-mag.com/home/article/16756799/mauritania-moves-closer-to-first-oil.
62 “Woodside to Drill More Wells Offshore Mauritania,” Rigzone, 9 May 2002, www.rigzone.com/news/
oil_gas/a/3297/woodside_to_drill_more_wells_offshore_mauritania/.
63 International Monetary Fund, Islamic Republic of Mauritania: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix,
2006, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06248.pdf.
64 Mauritania’s hydrocarbon contracts on resourcecontracts.org, resourcecontracts.org/
search?q=&country%5B%5D=MR&resource%5B%5D=Hydrocarbons.
65 Interestingly, this is not a change driven by the 2010 Petroleum Law, as the law includes a broad-based
stabilization clause.
66 Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Loi Numero 2010-033 du 20 Juillet 2010 Portant Approbation du
Code des Hydrocarbures Bruts, www.resourcedata.org/dataset/rgi-code-des-hydrocarbures-brutslaw-2010-033-/resource/8a633593-aeba-4ebc-b885-63ef52d01270.
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minimum state equity share, as well as stipulating that the contracts specify the
applicable rate above a minimum rate to be prescribed by the tax law (which dates
back to 1981). The law also sets the term of relinquishment, although these were
the same throughout the contracts, bar the 2007 contract (Mauritania 4) mentioned
above. While the direction of the changes brought about by the law does not follow
a clear pattern, it is noteworthy that nine years post-discovery, the law seeks to leave
fewer terms on the negotiation table.

Mauritania contracts pre- and post-Chinguetti: Key features
•

Analysis among seven contracts from 1999 to 2016.

• Discovery in 2001.
• Analysis of two pre-discovery and five post-discovery contracts.
• Post-discovery 2006 contract is similar to pre-discovery contracts, while post-discovery 2007 contract (Mauritania 4) has the most onerous fiscal and operational terms for
investors across all available Mauritanian contracts.
• The 2010 Petroleum Law leaves fewer terms for negotiating.
Category

Term type

Observation

Operational

Relinquishment of portions of the oil
block back to the state

Same throughout, except for the 2007
contract

Duration of first “exploration period”—
the time during which the company
is required to carry out exploration
activities

More investor-friendly from 2012 and
driven by the 2010 Petroleum Law

Minimum expenditure for first period
of exploration

Higher in post- than pre-discovery
contracts, with no pattern within the
former

Stabilization clause

Scope restricted to fiscal terms from
2012

Income tax

Driven by 2010 Petroleum Law

Exemption to income tax

Driven by 2010 Petroleum Law

Royalty

None

Profit oil

More investor-friendly from 2012 and
driven by 2010 Petroleum Law

Cost oil

More onerous on the investor from
2012 and driven by 2010 Petroleum
Law

Bonus (signature and production)

Larger post-discovery, starting from
2007

State equity

More investor-friendly from 2012 and
driven by 2010 Petroleum Law

Contribution to community

None

Local content

Consistent

Fiscal
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LIBERIA: MIXED
Liberia illustrates that discovery announcements can be illusory, and that the impact
of such announcements on contract terms can be fleeting. Oil exploration activities
offshore from Liberia, first undertaken in the 1970s and the 1980s, reported
shows of hydrocarbon in the basin. But low oil prices, the high cost of deep-water
drilling, and the deadly civil war ravaging the country led to companies abandoning
exploration efforts in the 1990s. From 2004, as the country was returning to peace,
a number of licenses were awarded to international oil companies, and Liberia
conducted several bid rounds. Neighboring finds in Ghana and Sierra Leone raised
interest in the basin. The entry of major oil companies such as Chevron, which
became the operator of three blocks in 2010, signaled a real interest in Liberia’s oil
sector.67
In November 2011, Anadarko found oil in offshore Liberia with its Montserrado-1
well. Although the company immediately decided to abandon that exploration
effort, as oil was not found in commercial quantities, the discovery was still
important news, as it “established there was a working hydrocarbon system in the
Liberian basin.”68 In February 2012, African Petroleum announced a “significant oil
discovery” on one of the blocks it operated (Narina-1).69 A year later, it announced
another oil discovery in the same block, suggesting these could have been part of
one large oil formation.70 While both exploration efforts found traces of oil, neither
was able to confirm the existence of a commercially viable field.71 The entrance
of ExxonMobil, acquiring a majority stake in a block in 2013, also showed the
heightened interest in the sector. In the meantime, Anadarko made additional
discoveries on a license next to African Petroleum in 2014 (Timbo and Iroko), but
these also proved to be non-commercial.
By 2015-2016, the country’s oil fortunes declined rapidly, partly because initial
prospects were found to be non-commercial, and partly because of a failure to bring
in new investors via a bid round,72 as the devastating Ebola outbreak raised investor
concerns.73 A number of companies (including Anadarko and Repsol) decided not

67 National Oil Company of Liberia, Background Briefing on Liberia, www.nocal.com.lr/pdf/Press_
Releases/Background_Briefing_on_Liberia.pdf
68 Hart Energy, “Liberian Well Comes Up Short With Non-Commercial Oil,” 11 November 2011, www.
epmag.com/liberian-well-comes-short-non-commercial-oil-669356.
69 National Oil Company of Liberia, Presentation on African Petroleum, Oil Discovery, February 2012,
www.nocal.com.lr/pdf/Speeches_Presentations/African_Petroleum_Oil_Discovery_Feb2012.pdf.
70 “African Petroleum Makes Oil Discovery Offshore Liberia,” Offshore Energy, 20 February 2013, www.
offshore-energy.biz/african-petroleum-makes-oil-discovery-offshore-liberia/.
71 “African Petroleum Exits Liberia,” Rigzone, 23 November 2016, www.rigzone.com/news/oil_
gas/a/147523/african_petroleum_exits_liberia/.
72 “NOCAL Collapses One Year On—Liberia’s Oil Basin Goes Quiet,” Front Page Africa, 14 September 2016,
frontpageafricaonline.com/business/nocal-collapses-one-year-on-liberia-s-oil-basin-goes-quiet/.
73 National Oil Company of Liberia, NOCAL Bid Round Explained, 17 December 2014, allafrica.com/
stories/201412171656.html.
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to renew their expiring licenses in 2016.74 African Petroleum also relinquished its
license in 2016, after failing to attract additional investors.75 Exxon drilled a dry hole
in late 2016, in what it had hoped to be a promising prospect,76 and relinquished its
license in 2017.77 By the end of 2017, most of the key explorers were gone.
We analyzed seven Liberian contracts78 from 2004 to 2015. Five of these are from
before the Anadarko and African Petroleum announcements and two are postannouncement. All contracts relate to offshore projects. Over time, the terms of
these contracts featured an increase in the government share of profit oil and in the
minimum exploration expenditures companies were required to make. The other
fiscal terms are consistent over time. The operational terms present no pattern,
except for the minimum required expenditure in the first exploration period,
which does show an increase after the initial discovery headlines. The local content
requirements loosen slightly over time, removing the joint-venture requirement
above a certain threshold of contract value. Of the two contracts signed postannouncement, the 2013 Exxon contract (Liberia 6)79 stands out, with pro-state
terms governing royalty, signature bonus and state equity that go beyond the other
contracts. The other post-announcement contract, signed with Repsol in 2015
(Liberia 7), features fewer notable changes from the pre-discovery regime.
The 200280 and 201481 Petroleum Laws specify equity shares, length of exploration,
relinquishment allocations and—only in the 2002 law—royalty rates. The 2000
Revenue Code and its 2011 Amendment82 define income tax for the petroleum
sector. Many of the provisions in these laws were not reflected in the contracts
that succeeded them, therefore it appears that these laws did not drive the above
changes. However, it is noteworthy the 2014 Petroleum Law is more lenient in the
terms that it set for state equity, exploration length and relinquishment than the
2002 Petroleum Law.

74 “NOCAL Collapses One Year On—Liberia’s Oil Basin Goes Quiet,” Front Page Africa, 14 September
2016, frontpageafricaonline.com/business/nocal-collapses-one-year-on-liberia-s-oil-basin-goesquiet/.
75 “African Petroleum Exits Liberia,” Rigzone, 23 November 2016, www.rigzone.com/news/oil_
gas/a/147523/african_petroleum_exits_liberia/.
76 “Liberia’s Hope for Oil Falters as ExxonMobil Fails to Find Oil,” Front Page Africa, 11 January 2018,
frontpageafricaonline.com/business/liberia-s-hope-for-oil-falters-as-exxonmobil-fails-to-find-oil/.
77 “Liberia: ExxonMobil and Canadian Overseas Petroleum Relinquish Block LB-13, Offshore Liberia,”
Energy-pedia News, 3 November 2017, www.energy-pedia.com/news/liberia/exxonmobil-andcanadian-overseas-petroleum-relinquish-block-lb-13--offshore-liberia-172166.
78 Liberia’s hydrocarbon contracts on resourcecontracts.org, resourcecontracts.org/
search?q=&country%5B%5D=LR&resource%5B%5D=Hydrocarbons.
79 Full contract, http://resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-6713867467/view#/pdf.
80 Republic of Liberia, Petroleum Law of 2002, www.eisourcebook.org/cms/December%202015/
Liberia%20Petroleum%20Law%202002.pdf.
81 Republic of Liberia, An Act to Amend and Restate the New Petroleum Law of Liberia 2002 Thereby
Establishing the New Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Reform Law of Liberia, 2014, www.nocal.
com.lr/operations/New%20Petroleum%20Law/Petroleum%20E&P%20Law%202016%20Final.pdf.
82 Republic of Liberia, Amendments to the Revenue Code of Liberia Act of 2000—
Consolidated Tax Amendments Act of 2011, www.lra.gov.lr/Admin/Official_Files/revenue_
code/05cbe7e98773ea91aa94aea6d86b91e1.pdf.
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Liberia contracts pre- and post-discovery: Key features
• We analyzed seven contracts from 2004 to 2015.
• The first announcement of a purported discovery was in 2011, with a second
discovery in 2012.
• Both discoveries were subsequently deemed non-commercial and have been
abandoned.
• Our sample includes five pre-discovery and two post-discovery contracts.
Category

Operational

Term type

Observation

Relinquishment of portions of the oil
block back to the state

No clear pattern

Duration of first “exploration period”—
the time during which the company
is required to carry out exploration
activities

No clear pattern

Minimum expenditure for first period
of exploration

Overall increase in minimum
expenditure in post- vs preannouncement contracts

Stabilization clause

Consistent

Income tax

No clear pattern

Exemption to income tax

None

Royalty

One of the post-announcement
contracts (with ExxonMobil, Liberia
6) includes a provision on royalties.
These are not included in the prediscovery contracts

Profit oil

Slight increase in post-announcement
agreements.

Cost oil

No clear pattern

Bonus (signature and production)

One of the post-announcement
contracts (with ExxonMobil, Liberia 6)
includes an additional bonus not seen
in the pre-announcement contracts

State equity

The post-announcement Liberia 6
contract with ExxonMobil includes
an option for state equity which is
absent from the pre-announcement
contracts

Contribution to community

None

Local content

Loosening of local content
requirements, which started preannouncement. Terms set by 2002
and 2014 Petroleum Laws have
been largely overridden by contract.
However, the 2014 law is more lenient
on the terms that it set for state equity,
exploration length and relinquishment.

Fiscal
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SENEGAL: MIXED
Petroleum was discovered in Senegal in 1967, but in small and uncommercial
quantities. The gamechanger was the SNE Deepwater Oil Field, discovered in
November 2014 on the Senegalese portion of the Mauritania-Senegal-Guinea
Bissau Basin. The discovery is classified as giant and was announced by the joint
venture managing the project as the largest oil discovery of 2014: “We have
encountered a very substantial oil-bearing interval which may have significant
potential as a standalone discovery. Furthermore, this result materially upgrades the
prospectivity of the block with a proven petroleum system and a number of deep
fan and shelf prospects established.”83
Following the SNE discovery, further appraisal wells were subsequently drilled in
2015 and 2016. These evaluations confirmed that the SNE field had oil and gas in
commercial quantities, with additional appraisal wells showing increasing amounts
of contingent recoverable resources from the field.84 A large gas field (Grande Tortue/
Ahmeyim) was also discovered by Kosmos Energy in 2015, straddling the SenegalMauritania border. The SNE field (renamed to Sangomar) reached FID in 2020.85
We analyzed five Senegalese contracts86 from 2004 to 2017—three pre-discovery
and two post-discovery. All relate to deep-water projects, with Senegal 5 being
in ultra-deep water. While some contract terms are tougher in the post-discovery
period (including on local content, minimum expenditure and work programs),
others became more pro-investor over time (including on profit oil, length of
exploration and relinquishment) or showed no pattern (cost oil). We note that the
ultra-deep-water Senegal 5 contract is more advantageous to the investor than the
other post-discovery Senegal 4 deep-water contract. This is expected, as ultra-deep
water entails higher uncertainty and cost of extraction. Terms related to corporate
income tax were set by the fiscal law changed in 2012, before the discovery.87
The petroleum law88 and its decree,89 dating back to 1998, did not drive the above
observed changes, being vague on all terms besides royalties, which interestingly do
not feature in the contracts we analyzed.
83 Full quotation: “The oil discovered in the FAN-1 prospect is an important event for Senegal and the
Joint Venture. We have encountered a very substantial oil-bearing interval which may have significant
potential as a standalone discovery. Furthermore, this result materially upgrades the prospectivity of
the block with a proven petroleum system and a number of deep fan and shelf prospects established.
Work is already underway with the Joint Venture partners to determine follow-up activity which is
targeted for 2015 onwards. Cairn looks forward to working with the Government of Senegal and our
partners to realise the full potential from this large acreage position off the West coast of Senegal.”
FAR Ltd., The World’s Largest Oil Discovery 2014—Presentation to Melbourne Mining Club, 15
March 2016, www.melbourneminingclub.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/CE-PresentationsMarch-15-2016.pdf.
84 FAR Ltd., The World’s Largest Oil Discovery 2014—Presentation to Melbourne Mining Club, 15 March
2016, http://www.melbourneminingclub.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/CE-PresentationsMarch-15-2016.pdf; “SNE Deepwater Oil Field,” Offshore Technology, www.offshore-technology.com/
projects/sne-deepwater-oil-field/, accessed 22 January 2021.
85 Cairn Energy, Cairn Takes Final Investment Decision on Sangomar Field Development in Senegal, 15
January 2020, www.cairnenergy.com/news-media/news/2020/cairn-takes-final-investment-decisionon-sangomar-field-development-in-senegal/#Tabundefined=1.
86 Senegal’s hydrocarbon contracts on resourcecontracts.org, resourcecontracts.org/
search?q=&country%5B%5D=SN&resource%5B%5D=Hydrocarbons.
87 Republique du Senegal, Code General des Impots, 31 December 2012, http://www.jo.gouv.sn/spip.
php?article9554.
88 Republique du Senegal, Loi Numero 98-05 Portant Code Pétrolier, 8 January 1998, itie.sn/
reglementation/.
89 Republique du Senegal, Projet de Decret Numero 98-810, Fixant les Modalités et Conditions
d’Application de la Loi Numero 98-05 du 08 Janvier 1998 Portant Code Pétrolier, www.slideshare.net/
rignese/dcret-n-98810-du-06-octobre-1998-fixant-les-modalits-et-conditions-dapplication-de-la-loin-9805-du-08-janvier-1998-portant-code-ptrolier.
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Senegal contracts pre- and post-discovery: Key features
• Analysis among five contracts from 2004 to 2017 in deep water.
• Giant discovery in 2014.
• Analysis of three pre-discovery and two post-discovery contracts (including one in ultradeep water)
• All changes are contractual, as the laws regulating contracts, the 1998 Petroleum Law
and further decrees, are very vague.
Category

Term type

Observation

Operational

Relinquishment of portions of the oil
block back to the state

Less stringent post-discovery

Duration of first “exploration period”—
the time during which the company
is required to carry out exploration
activities

Less onerous for the investor over
time

Minimum expenditure for first period
of exploration

Overall increase over time

Stabilization clause

Consistent

Income tax

Driven by the tax law that changed
pre-discovery, in 2012

Exemption to income tax

Driven by the tax law that changed
pre-discovery

Royalty

Range of royalty rates is set by 1998
law, but contracts do not mention
royalties

Profit oil

Slight loosening in favor of the
investor, in particular for Senegal 4
and Senegal 5

Cost oil

No clear pattern

Bonus (signature and production)

None

State equity

Consistent

Contribution to community

None

Local content

Contributions to training, promotion,
and equipment of the sector; overall
increase over time

Fiscal
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KENYA: MIXED
While exploration for oil in Kenya began in 1954, high oil prices from 2004,
accompanied by large-scale oil and gas discoveries in neighboring Tanzania and
Uganda, resulted in an increase in exploration activity.90 Oil was discovered, and
in commercially viable quantities, in March 2012.91 This was followed by a series
of discoveries in two blocks in the South Lokichar basin (blocks 10BB and 13T).
Confirmed recoverable reserves in these blocks increased from an initial 300 million
barrels to 600 million barrels in 2014 and then to 750 million barrels in 2016.
However, in early 2018, this figure was revised down to 540 million barrels.92
While oil exploration in other parts of Kenya has slowed since the fall in global oil
prices in 2014,93 it is still taking place with some success.94 Estimates of potential
recoverable reserves in Kenya as a whole have ranged from 1.4 billion to 10 billion
barrels, but it remains to be seen whether such expectations will be met.95 No final
investment decision has been made, but the country started small-scale production
in 2018 from the South Lokichar basin, as part of an early oil pilot scheme.96
We analyzed five publicly available Kenyan contracts,97 the earliest signed in 2007
and the latest in 2015, two of which were model contracts (one pre-discovery,
Kenya 3, and one post-discovery, Kenya 5). The contracts all concerned onshore
blocks, though none was in the same basin as the 2012 discovery, which could limit
the impact of Lokichar on the government’s negotiating leverage.
We did not discern a pattern in the contracts reviewed. Some terms became more
onerous for investors over time. For example, the length of the first exploration period
was reduced by a year post-discovery, the bonus payment went up, state equity
increased and investors were required to contribute to community development
projects, as well as comply with more detailed local content provisions.
However, we also saw some terms become less onerous for investors. We observed
a reduction in the minimum exploration investment required, and a higher cost-oil
limit. While it is difficult to discern an overall pattern in the contracts signed with
investors, there was a noteworthy evolution in the model contract. The 2015

90 PWC, Towards a Petroleum Sector Master Plan for Kenya, www.pwc.com/ke/en/assets/pdf/
petroleum-sector-master-plan-for-kenya.pdf; Luke Patey, A Belated Boom: Uganda, Kenya, South
Sudan and Prospects and Risks for Oil in East Africa, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, May 2017,
www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/A-Belated-Boom-Uganda-KenyaSouth-Sudan-and-prospects-and-risks-for-oil-in-East-Africa-WPM-71.pdf.
91 Tullow Oil Plc., Ngamia1 Oil Discovery in Kenya Rift Basin, 26 March 2012, www.tullowoil.com/media/
press-releases/ngamia-1-oil-discovery-in-kenya-rift-basin.
92 Tullow Oil Plc., 2017 Annual Report, www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/T/
LSE_TLW_2017.pdf.
93 Luke Patey, A Belated Boom: Uganda, Kenya, South Sudan and Prospects and Risks for Oil in East
Africa, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, May 2017, www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/
uploads/2017/05/A-Belated-Boom-Uganda-Kenya-South-Sudan-and-prospects-and-risks-for-oil-inEast-Africa-WPM-71.pdf.
94 See, for example, Rick Wilkinson, “BG Group Make Oil, Gas Discovery Off Kenya, Oil & Gas Journal, 19
June 2014, www.ogj.com/articles/2014/06/bg-led-group-make-oil-gas-discovery-off-kenya.html.
95 PWC, Towards a Petroleum Sector Master Plan for Kenya, www.pwc.com/ke/en/assets/pdf/
petroleum-sector-master-plan-for-kenya.pdf; Katrina Manson, “Kenya’s Oil and Mineral Prospects Fire
Global Interest,” Financial Times, 25 November 2013, www.ft.com/content/20badca4-504b-11e39f0d-00144feabdc0.
96 “Kenya Project On Track Despite Unrest,” Petroleum Economist, www.petroleum-economist.com/
articles/politics-economics/africa/2018/kenya-project-on-track-despite-unrest.
97 Kenya’s hydrocarbon contracts on resourcecontracts.org, resourcecontracts.org/
search?q=&country%5B%5D=ke&resource%5B%5D=Hydrocarbons.
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model, adopted post-discovery, left fewer terms open for negotiation, specifying
relinquishment, cost oil and profit oil. We did not find evidence that laws of the
relevant period determined any of the contractual provisions.
One possible explanation for the mixed changes in terms is that the contract areas
analyzed are geographically further apart, in what may constitute different onshore
basins, and only one has proven reserves. The different locations may also have
different pipeline requirements for commercialization, which may be reflected in
contract terms because of cost implications.

Kenya contracts pre- and post-discovery: Key features
• Kenya made a commercial discovery of oil in March 2012.
• Our sample included five contracts from 2007-2015.
• Three contracts were pre-discovery (two signed contracts and a 2008 model contract)
and two were post-discovery (one from May 2012, two months post-discovery, and a
model contract from 2015).
• Comparing the model contracts alone, there does seem to be some pattern:
relinquishment, cost oil and profit oil splits are all specified in the later model contract,
whereas pre-discovery, they are left open to negotiation.
Category

Operational

Fiscal

Term type

Observation

Relinquishment of portions of the oil
block back to the state

Largely consistent, but the prediscovery model contract leaves
the relinquishment percentage to
be negotiated, whereas the postdiscovery model does not

Duration of first “exploration period”—
the time during which the company
is required to carry out exploration
activities

A one-year reduction in the postdiscovery contract

Minimum expenditure for first period
of exploration

Reduction in minimum exploration
investment in post-discovery contract

Stabilization clause

Consistent

Income tax

Consistent and in accordance with
the law

Exemption to income tax

None

Royalty

None

Profit oil

No significant pattern

Cost oil

Cost oil limit higher in post-discovery
contracts

Bonus (signature and production)

Increase in bonus payment in postdiscovery contract

State equity

Slightly higher state participation in
post-discovery contract

Contribution to community

Requirement to contribute money
toward community development
projects in a post-discovery contract

Local content

More detailed and onerous local
content provisions in post-discovery
contracts
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5. Discussion of results
Our contract analysis shows that some new producer countries did seem to take
advantage of apparent leverage in the wake of a discovery to negotiate deals that
sought to give the state a larger share of the financial and other benefits from
potential future discoveries. Three of the eight countries with available contracts
exhibited a clear pattern of strengthening the state’s hand once a discovery took
them beyond the realm of being seen as “frontier” countries.
In some cases, the change in approach appears to be dramatic. In one (Ghana 5),
Ghana negotiated a post-discovery contract that increased the contractor’s royalty
obligation from 7.5 percent to 12.5 percent, and more than doubled the maximum
equity share for the national oil company. In other cases, the changes, while clear,
do not seem to dramatically increase the government’s prospects for revenues
or control. It was beyond the scope of this analysis to assess the overall impact of
changes or to compare them against some hypothetical assessment of how well a
country could have done in a post-discovery landscape. But the public contracts
from these three countries suggest that the theory is valid, and that countries did, in
practice, attempt to strengthen their hand after discovery.
Perhaps a more interesting observation is that the other five countries we examined
did not demonstrate any clear pattern in the direction of more state-friendly terms
in the wake of their discoveries. In some cases, our designation of “mixed” results
reflects divergences across different contracts. The contract that Liberia signed
with ExxonMobil in 2013 (Liberia 6) contained significant steps that increased
the government’s prospective take, for example, but another contract signed
subsequently did not contain similar changes, and a revised law in 2014 made
additional concessions to investors. In other cases, even within specific contracts
there was no clear directional trend, with some post-discovery terms more
government friendly and others more pro-investor within the same contract.
Table 4 summarizes the changes across the countries. The terms in which progovernment changes were most common included duration of and minimum
expenditure on exploration; royalties and bonuses. In common, these terms are
relatively straightforward to design and implement. This could mean that it is
reasonably easy for governments to incorporate them into negotiation strategies
and new contracts. Cross-country patterns are less apparent for other terms, such as
income tax, profit and cost oil, and local content.
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Table 4: Cross-country changes per contract term
Category

Term type

Countries where terms became
clearly more stringent

Relinquishment of portions of the oil
block back to the state

Guyana, Senegal

Duration of first “exploration period”

Uganda, Mozambique (Rovuma and
PT), Kenya

Senegal

Minimum expenditure for first period of
exploration

Ghana, Mauritania, Liberia, Senegal

Kenya

Stabilization clause

Ghana, Mozambique (Rovuma and PT)

Income tax

Ghana (additional oil entitlement)

Exemptions from income tax

Mozambique (Rovuma and PT)

Royalty

Ghana, Uganda, Mozambique (Rovuma
and PT)

Profit oil

Mozambique (Rovuma and PT);
Guyana, Liberia

Mauritania, Senegal

Cost oil

Mozambique (Rovuma and PT);
Mauritania

Kenya

Bonus (signature and production)

Uganda, Mozambique (PT), Mauritania,
Liberia, Kenya

State equity

Ghana, Kenya

Contribution to community

Kenya

Local content

Mozambique (Rovuma), Uganda (1 of 2
contracts), Senegal, Kenya

Operational

Fiscal

Countries where terms became
clearly less stringent
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4. Conclusion and policy
implications
Our results show that the path from being a frontier country to a producer country
with leverage to insist on dramatically more stringent contract terms has never
been linear or predictable. This research adds to recent work highlighting other
challenges that new producers face in meeting the dramatic expectations that arise
in the wake of a discovery.98 Major discoveries did not necessarily translate directly
to increased leverage in contract negotiations. Our results point to several other
factors that impacted the pathways of these negotiations:
•

Not all “discoveries” are created equal. Some prove illusory (Liberia, most
clearly among our cases), while others generate strong investor enthusiasm for a
time before fading into disappointment (such as Mauritania’s Chinguetti).

•

Leverage and industry perception vary by geological basin, not just by country.
Although political leaders sometimes talk about a country emerging from
frontier status, the industry’s perception of potential and risk depend in large
measure on geology. In countries including Kenya and Mozambique, the
discovery of one viable basin did not fundamentally transform assessments of
prospectivity in other parts of the country.

•

Regulatory factors may also impact risk perception, especially in situations in
which governments and companies struggle for years to reach FID or to move
from discovery to production.

•

Gas is not oil, and commercial discoveries where gas plays a prominent role
in total project value will not necessarily lead to increased leverage for the
government on new gas projects, as these depend heavily on the associated
gas infrastructure, such as for liquid natural gas or pipelines to enable
transportation to market.

•

Politics and capacity matter. The government’s strategic approach, capacity to
execute its strategy and relationships with various stakeholders have a major
impact on goals and results.

Overhanging all these considerations is the fact that market conditions are the
most significant drivers of investor interest and government leverage. When prices
plummeted in 2014, exploration budgets tightened worldwide.99 This changed
perceptions of the thresholds for commercial viability, and generally altered the
leverage governments could exert in trying to attract investor dollars.

98 See, for example, Mihalyi and Scurfield, How Did Africa’s Prospective Petroleum Producers Fall
Victim to the Presource Curse?; James Cust and David Mihalyi, Evidence for a Presource Curse? Oil
Discoveries, Elevated Expectations and Growth Disappointments, World Bank, 2017, openknowledge.
worldbank.org/handle/10986/27643.
99 Gerhard Toews and Alexander Naumov. The Relationship Between Oil Price and Costs in the Oil and
Gas Industry, (Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, 2015), www.economics.
ox.ac.uk/materials/papers/13819/paper152.pdf.
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2020 brought new challenges, with COVID-19 dramatically reducing oil demand
and the investment budgets of oil companies.100 At a more fundamental level, the
prospect of long-term decline in fossil fuel prices amid the global energy transition
is exacerbating uncertainties. The International Energy Agency has found that in
order for the world to reach net-zero emissions by 2050, no new oil and gas fields
that have not already reached FID should be approved.101 The drive to reduce global
emissions has major implications for decisions that governments will make about
whether to engage in additional licensing or contracting at all, and what terms
to prioritize were they do so. The think-tank Carbon Tracker estimates that the
revenues governments collect from oil and gas projects could decline by $13 trillion
below usual expectations if the world achieves the reductions in demand for fossil
fuels necessary to reach the International Energy Agency’s low-carbon Sustainable
Demand Scenario.102 With fewer profits in the industry and smaller available
investment pools, there is the prospect of a “race to the bottom” in contract terms,
and some new producer governments have indicated that they are considering
speeding up licensing or loosening fiscal terms in order to be more attractive.103
In making decisions about whether and when to conduct licensing exercises, and
on how to structure government demands on new projects going forward, recent
experience suggests that new producer governments should aim to:
•

Integrate oil sector decisions with government priorities on national
development, energy and climate. It is more important than ever that ministries
of petroleum and energy or national oil companies avoid making decisions
in a silo. With the increasing pressure on governments to take advantage of
extraction for development, live up to climate commitments and increase
energy access—on an ever-tightening timetable—cross-governmental
coordination is critical to promote coherence.

•

Set clear priorities and objectives. Governments should and integrate their
objectives coherently into planning processes, licensing decisions and
negotiations. This will be more important than ever before, as profit margins
in the industry are squeezed more tightly going forward. One factor that can
spur a “race to the bottom” is a lack of prioritization, wherein governments
rush to award contracts as a goal in itself, rather than focusing on achieving
defined economic and development objectives and determining regulatory and
contractual frameworks based on these objectives.

•

Communicate regularly and openly with industry counterparts. This is
important in order to understand the market’s perceptions of the country, its
geology and its fiscal terms, as well as broader trends in the market.

100 See Rystad Energy Research, COVID-19 Report, 8th Edition: Global Outbreak Overview and Its Impact
on the Energy Sector, 29 April 2020, which forecast a 24 percent year-on-year decrease in oil-sector
capital expenditure.
101 International Energy Agency, Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector, May 2021,
https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050.
102 Mike Coffin, Axel Dalman and Andrew Grant, Beyond Petrostates: The Burning Need to Cut Oil
Dependence in the Energy Transition, Carbon Tracker, February 2021, https://carbontracker.org/
reports/petrostates-energy-transition-report/.
103 See, for example, Libby George, “African oil states offer new deals to lure more selective investors,”
Reuters, 11 November 2019, af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFKBN1XL1F7-OZABS;
Alastair O’Dell, “Ghana aims to speed up,” Petroleum Economist, 7 November 2019, www.petroleumeconomist.com/articles/politics-economics/africa/2019/ghana-aims-to-speed-up.
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•

Award contracts by competitive bidding. Where governments decide to pursue
licensing or to negotiate new contracts, competitive bidding is the surest way
for the state to understand the market, select partners effectively and maximize
company contributions.

•

Standardize terms in legislation. By setting contract terms in law to the
maximum degree possible and reducing the scope of terms open to negotiation
on individual contracts, governments increase their opportunity to set the
terms for deals, based on a coherent strategy reflecting emerging realities.

•

Build institutional memory and learning. By drawing on experience from past
contract bidding, negotiation and implementation, governments can build
strength in sector management and avoid repeating mistakes.

•

Stress-test contract terms, fiscal regimes and the country’s cost of production.
This can enable governments to manage national risk against a variety of energy
transition scenarios. The exact pace at which the global energy transition
will proceed is uncertain, but many countries and companies have already
announced plans to reach carbon neutrality by 2050.104 Several international
oil companies have begun to lower their long-term price forecasts, write down
projects that are no longer expected to be profitable and limit exploration in new
frontiers.105 Not all oil companies publish their price forecasts, but several—
including BP, Shell and Total—have recently published long-term forecasts
of $60 per barrel, and analysts estimate the world keeping to a Paris-aligned
carbon budget would result in long-term prices of $40-50 per barrel. These
figures are below the cost of production for many projects in new producer
countries, meaning these projects could struggle to break even.106 In this
context, assessing whether a project would deliver strong returns to the state
under a range of price and demand scenarios is critical to enable governments
to make informed decisions about whether to proceed with licensing, and on
which terms.

104 Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit, Net Zero Tracker, eciu.net/netzerotracker; NS Energy, Which major
oil companies have set net-zero emissions targets?, 16 December 2020, www.nsenergybusiness.com/
features/oil-companies-net-zero/; Carbon Intelligence, Following the UK Government’s announcement
to be Net Zero by 2050 many businesses have set their own ambitious targets to tackle climate change,
February 2021, carbon.ci/insights/companies-with-net-zero-targets/
105 See Jillian Ambrose, “Seven Top Oil Firms Downgrade Assets by $87bn in Nine Months,” The Guardian,
15 August 2020, www.theguardian.com/business/2020/aug/14/seven-top-oil-firms-downgradeassets-by-87bn-in-nine-months (on write-downs by oil companies in the wake of lowering price
estimates); Stanley Reed, “BP Reports a Huge Loss and Vows to Increase Renewable Investment,”
New York Times, 4 August 2020, www.nytimes.com/2020/08/04/business/energy-environment/
bp-renewable-investment.html (highlighting the company’s commitment not to start exploring in any
new countries).
106 For an overview of a range of long-term price estimates and their implications for new oil and gas
projects, see David Manley and Patrick R.P. Heller, Risky Bet: National Oil Companies in the Energy
Transition, Natural Resource Governance Institute, February 2021, resourcegovernance.org/analysistools/publications/risky-bet-national-oil-companies-energy-transition, 3-6; Espen Erlingsen, “Oil
Production Costs Reach New Lows, Making Deepwater One of the Cheapest Sources of Novel Supply,”
Rystad Energy Press Release, 21 October 2020, www.rystadenergy.com/clients/articles/pressreleases/oil-production-costs-reach-new-lows-making-deepwater-one-of-the-cheapest-sources-ofnovel-supply/.
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At a broader level, the time has come for new producers to look for opportunities to
innovate, including by working within government and with prospective partners.
Approaches include:
•

Systematically adopting terms within extractive contracts that better protect
governments and companies against long-term volatility and uncertainty, such
as periodic review or progressive fiscal terms.

•

Developing new terms that minimize the carbon footprint in operations, while
keeping them cost-competitive—for example, zero routine flaring and the use of
renewable energies to power the operations.

•

Apply the skills and practices developed in the hydrocarbons sector to new areas
of potential growth, including climate-smart mining and agriculture, renewable
energy technology and green hydrogen.
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Appendix: Contracts
GHANA
Ghana 1: Kosmos Energy Ghana HC, E.O. Group, West Cape Three Points Block,
Concession, 2004
Ghana 2: Tullow Ghana Limited, Sabre Oil and Gas Limited, Kosmos Energy Ghana
HC, Deepwater Tano, Concession, 2006
Ghana 3: Ghana National Petroleum Corporation, Vitol Upstream Ghana Limited,
Cape Three Points South, PSA, 2008
Ghana 4: Medea Development Limited, Cola Natural Resources, Ghana National
Petroleum Corporation, East Cape Three Points, Concession Agreement, 2013
Ghana 5: UB Resources Limited, Royalgate Gh Limited, Houston Drilling
Management Ghana Limited, Ghana National Petroleum Corporation, Offshore
Cape Three Points South, Concession Agreement, September 2014
Ghana 6: GNPC Operating Services Company Limited, Heritage Exploration
and Production Ghana Limited, Blue Star Exploration Ghana Limited, GNPC
Exploration and Production Company Limited, East Keta Offshore, Concession
Agreement, 2015
Ghana 7: Swiss African Oil Company Limited, Pet Volta Investments Limited,
Ghana National Petroleum Corporation, Onshore Offshore Keta Delta Block,
Concession Agreement, 2015
Ghana 8: Springfield E&P Limited, Ghana National Petroleum Corporation, GNPC
Exploration and Production Company Limited, West Cape Three Points Block 2,
Concession Agreement, 2015

GUYANA
Guyana 1: Esso Exploration and Production Guyana Ltd., Liza Well, PSA, 1999
Guyana 2: Anadarko Guyana Company, Roraima, PSA, 2012
Guyana 3: CGX Resources Inc, PSA, 2013
Guyana 4: Tullow Guyana B.V., Eco Oil and Gas Limited, Orinduik Block, PSA,
2016
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KENYA
Kenya 1: Lion Petroleum Inc., Block 1, PSA, 2007
Kenya 2: Lion Petroleum Inc., Block 2B, PSA, 2008
Kenya 3: Model Contract, PSA, 2008
Kenya 4: CAMAC Energy Kenya Limited, Block L1B, PSA, 2012
Kenya 5: Model Contract, PSA, 2015

LIBERIA
Liberia 1: Repsol Exploracion SA, National Oil Company of Liberia, Block LB-17,
PSA, 2004
Liberia 2: Regal Liberia Limited European Hydrocarbons Limited, National Oil
Company of Liberia, Block 8, PSA, 2005
Liberia 3: Broadway Consolidated PLC, National Oil Company of Liberia, Offshore
Block 13, PSA, 2005
Liberia 4: Oranto Petroleum Limited, National Oil Company of Liberia, Block LB12, PSA 2006
Liberia 5: Oranto Petroleum Limited, National Oil Company of Liberia, Block LB14, PSA, 2009
Liberia 6: ExxonMobil Exploration and Production Liberia Limited, Canadian
Overseas Petroleum (Bermuda) Limited, National Oil Company of Liberia, Block
13, PSA, 2013
Liberia 7: Repsol Exploracion S.A., National Oil Company of Liberia, Block LB-16,
PSA, 2015

MAURITANIA
Mauritania 1: Dana Petroleum E&P Ltd, Hardman Petroleum Pty Ltd, Elixir
Company, PSA, 1999
Mauritania 2: Dana Petroleum (E&P) Limited, Hardman Petroleum (Mauritania)
Pty Ltd., Elixir Corporation Pty Ltd., Côtier Block 7, PSA, 1999
Mauritania 3: Woodside Mauritania Pty Ltd., Petronas Carigali Overseas Sdn Bhd,
Hardman Petroleum (Mauritania) Pty Ltd., ROC Oil (Mauritania) Company, Planet
Oil (Mauritania) Limited, Côtier Block 6, PSA, 2006
Mauritania 4: Blue Chip Energy S.A., Bloc 32, PSA, 2007
Mauritania 5: Kosmos Energy Mauritania, Bloc C13, PSA, 2012
Mauritania 6: Kosmos Energy Mauritania, Bloc C8, PSA, 2012
Mauritania 7: Kosmos Energy Mauritania, Block C6, PSA, 2016
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MOZAMBIQUE
Mozambique 1: Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos E.P., Anadarko Moçambique
Área 1 Limitada, Rovuma Offshore Area 1, PSA, 2006
Mozambique 2: Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos E.P., Eni East Africa S.p.A.,
Rovuma Offshore Area 4, PSA, 2006
Mozambique 3: Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos E.P., Artumas Moçambique
Petróleos, Limitada, Rovuma Onshore Area, PSA, 2007
Mozambique 4: Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos E.P., PC Mozambique
(Rovuma Basin) Ltd., Rovuma Offshore Area 3-Rovuma Offshore Area 6, PSA,
2008
Mozambique 5: Eni Mozambico, Sasol Petroleum Mozambique Exploration
Limitada, Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos, Block A5-A, PSA, 2018
Mozambique 6: ExxonMobil Moçambique Exploration and Production Limitada,
RN Angoche PTE. LTD, Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos, Block A5-B, PSA,
2018
Mozambique 1b: Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos E.P., Sasol Petroleum
Mozambique Limitada, Pande-Temane, PSA, 2000
Mozambique 2b: Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos E.P., Sasol Petroleum Sofala
Limitada, Offshore Block 16-Offshore Block 19, PSA, 2005
Mozambique 3b: Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos E.P., Sasol Petroleum
Mozambique Exploration Limitada, Onshore Area A, PSA, 2010
Mozambique 4b: Sasol Petroleum Mozambique Exploration Limitada, Empresa
Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos, Block PT5-C, PSA, 2018
Mozambique 1c: Model contract, 2006
Mozambique 2c: Model contract, 2016
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SENEGAL
Senegal 1: Senegal Hunt Oil Company, Societe des Petroles du Senegal, Rufisque
Offshore, Sangomar Offshore Profond, Sangomar Offshore, PSA, 2004
Senegal 2: African Petroleum Senegal Limited, Société des Pétroles du Sénégal, PSA,
2011
Senegal 3: Petro-Tim Limited, Societe des Petroles du Senegal, Cayar Offshore
Profond, PSA, 2012
Senegal 4: Total E&P Senegal, Société des Pétroles du Sénégal, Rufisque Offshore
Profond block, PSA, 2017
Senegal 5: Total E&P Senegal, Société des Pétroles du Sénégal, Ultra Deep Offshore
block, PSA, 2017

UGANDA
Uganda 1: Heritage Oil and Gas Limited, Energy Africa Uganda Limited,
Exploration Area 3A (“EA3A”), PSA, 2004 - Part 1
Uganda 2: Tullow Uganda Limited, Kanywataba Prospect Area, PSA, 2012
Uganda 3: Tullow Uganda Limited, Area 1, PSA, 2012
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